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The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism
Jim Rossi*
For much of the past eighty years, courts have fixated on dual
sovereignty as the organizing federalism paradigm under New Deal-era
energy statutes. Dual sovereignty’s reign emphasized a jurisdictional
“bright line,” a fixed and legalistic boundary between federal and state
regulators. This Article explores how three recent Supreme Court decisions
limit dual sovereignty’s role as the organizing federalism principle under
energy statutes.
These recent decisions do not approach federal–state jurisdiction as an
either/or proposition, but instead recognize it is concurrent for many energy
transactions. Concurrent jurisdiction opens up a brave new path of
possibilities for energy federalism but also has been a target of criticism,
including in Justice Scalia’s last published dissent. This Article defends
concurrent jurisdiction as consistent with the language, history, structure,
and primary purposes of energy statutes.
At the same time, energy federalism’s path continues to navigate a trove
of doctrinal relics from dual sovereignty’s reign, such as field preemption.
These doctrines must be cleared from federalism’s path if regulators are to
successfully address the challenges presented by modern energy markets:
expanding clean-energy resources, integrating those resources into the grid,
protecting reliability, addressing energy security, and monitoring
anticompetitive conduct that is harmful to consumers, to name a few. The
Article concludes by calling on courts and regulators to be attentive to
opportunities for promoting democratically-accountable agency preemption
while addressing the challenges of new forms of energy federalism.
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Introduction
Federalism has always structured the regulation of domestic energy
markets. It has now been eighty years since Congress first began the
regulation of interstate energy markets with the adoption of the Federal
Power Act (FPA) in 19351 followed by the Natural Gas Act (NGA) in 1938.2
Each of these statutes gave the Federal Power Commission (FPC), which
later would become the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
jurisdiction to regulate wholesale energy sales but preserved state authority
over retail transactions. Courts traditionally refer to this allocation of
authority between wholesale (federal) and retail (state) energy sales as the
jurisdictional “bright line” that defines spheres of exclusive authority based
on a fixed, legalistic inquiry.3
For many decades following the New Deal, dual sovereignty4 coexisted
rather peacefully with traditional utility-rate regulation in energy industries.
The jurisdictional bright line proved useful for sorting out jurisdictional
disputes where both state and federal regulators set energy prices under
similar cost-of-service principles. Aided by field-preemption doctrine,
judicial recognition of comprehensive federal authority over wholesale

1. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, 49 Stat. 838 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 824–
824w (2012)).
2. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, 52 Stat. 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–
717w (2012)).
3. See, e.g., FPC v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964); see also Robert R.
Nordhaus, The Hazy “Bright Line”: Defining Federal and State Regulation of Today’s Electric
Grid, 36 ENERGY L.J. 203, 206 (2015).
4. By “dual sovereignty,” I mean the principle that “the nation and the states were each
authorized to control autonomous and distinct domains of social life.” Robert Post, Federalism in
the Taft Court Era: Can It Be “Revived”?, 51 DUKE L.J. 1513, 1518 (2002).
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energy sales helped to minimize the dysfunctions presented by state
regulators’ insulation of energy utilities from the interstate energy market.5
During this era, judicial resolution of federalism disputes helped to minimize
the problems presented to energy firms by having two potential regulators
and eased regulators’ implementation of traditional rate regulation. Legal
formalities such as the “filed rate doctrine” (which served as a form of federal
preemption) helped to reinforce the jurisdictional bright line.6
However, as these New Deal-era statutes enter their octogenarian phase,
new developments in the energy industry have revealed serious cracks in the
foundational facts behind dual sovereignty.7 Today, energy firms face a
dynamic economic environment. Energy markets, previously were insulated
from the pressures of competition, now face volatility from new entrants and
technologies.8 An electric-power sector once dominated by the staid,
vertically integrated utility has evolved into a diverse range of energy
suppliers and related service providers, many lacking the same service
obligations as utilities.9 Customers who were once captive to regulated
utilities now face choices of energy suppliers and are exposed to price
volatility.10 New technologies such as digital metering interfaces, rooftop
solar, and energy storage have also enabled customers to become energy

5. As the Supreme Court has observed:
[W]hen the FPA became law, most electricity was sold by vertically integrated utilities
that had constructed their own power plants, transmission lines, and local delivery
systems. Although there were some interconnections among utilities, most operated
as separate, local monopolies subject to state or local regulation. Their sales were
“bundled,” meaning that consumers paid a single charge that included both the cost of
the electric energy and the cost of its delivery. Competition among utilities was not
prevalent.
New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5 (2002). For examples where the Court deployed field preemption
vis-à-vis the NGA and FPA to invalidate state regulations, see Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,
485 U.S. 293, 310 (1988), and Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966
(1986).
6. See Jim Rossi, Lowering the Filed Tariff Shield: Judicial Enforcement for a Deregulatory
Era, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1591, 1642, 1645 (2003) (criticizing the filed tariff doctrine for producing
a kind of implied preemption that “simply would not survive the appropriate preemption analysis”).
7. Cf. Suzanna Sherry, Foundational Facts and Doctrinal Change, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 145,
146–47 (observing how changes in legal doctrine track changes in underlying factual assumptions).
8. See PETER KIND, DISRUPTIVE CHALLENGES: FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND STRATEGIC
RESPONSES TO A CHANGING RETAIL ELECTRIC BUSINESS
3,
7
(2013),
http://www.eei.org/ourissues/finance/documents/disruptivechallenges.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N2DD-AA3Y] (observing that the “electric utility sector has not previously
experienced a viable disruptive threat” but that could change due to “technological innovation” and
“disruptive forces”).
9. See David B. Spence, Can Law Manage Competitive Energy Markets?, 93 CORNELL L. REV.
765, 769–70, 772–75 (2008) (chronicling the unbundling of the vertically integrated monopolistic
American energy market since the 1980s).
10. Emily Hammond & David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69
VAND. L. REV. 141, 156 (2016).
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resources.11 A once-predictable sector now faces disruption from rapid
innovation and the onset (and occasional failure) of new technologies.12 With
the rise of interstate energy markets since the 1990s, coupled with the
transformation of the traditional public utility, state regulation of the energy
sector can no longer operate in isolation of broader regional and national
energy policies.13 The emergence of new environmental regulations of
carbon emissions from existing power plants also calls into question the
efficacy of any neat separation of federal and state spheres of authority. As
one recent agency report observes, any federal regulation of carbon emissions
will require the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to coordinate its
policies with state and federal energy regulators, depending on their support
to ensure that environmental regulations do not interfere with reliable
generation and transmission.14
While it was once believed, at least by some, that federalism conflicts
would begin to disappear with the rise of competitive energy markets,15 in
fact the opposite has occurred. The competitive threat of new technologies
has seriously blurred the clear jurisdictional lines of dual sovereignty.16
Litigants routinely invoke dual sovereignty as they ask courts to step in and
referee any time regulators are perceived as stepping outside of their
predefined bounds.17 At the extreme, dual sovereignty’s legacy can bind
regulators by reinforcing judicially-defined limits on their authority. This
approach hamstrings agency regulators from adopting proactive regulatory
approaches that can adapt as they seek to balance important goals in the
regulation of energy markets, such as expanding clean-energy resources,
integrating those resources into the grid, protecting reliability, addressing

11. Nordhaus, supra note 3, at 212; Amy L. Stein, Distributed Reliability, 87 U. COLO. L. REV.
887, 888–90 (2016) (documenting the capacity of customers to both satisfy electricity demand as
well as contribute to reliability resources—energy storage and demand response); see KIND, supra
note 11, at 3–6 (predicting that the rise of new technologies may allow consumers to exit the grid).
12. KIND, supra note 11, at 3.
13. See James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. Smith, Regulatory Federalism and Development of
Electric Transmission: A Brewing Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71, 73–74 (2014) (defending the
necessity of increased coordination between state and federal regulators in light of changes in
electricity markets over the last two decades).
14. See Press Release, FERC, EPA-DOE-FERC Coordination on Implementation of the Clean
Power Plan 1–5 (Aug. 3, 2015), https://www.ferc.gov/media/headlines/2015/CPP-EPA-DOEFERC.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GT6-RFYM]. For a discussion of the need for policy alignments
between the EPA and FERC, see generally Todd S. Aagaard, Energy-Environment Policy
Alignments, 90 WASH. L. REV. 1517 (2015).
15. See, e.g., Charles G. Stalon & Reinier H.J.H. Lock, State-Federal Relations in the Economic
Regulation of Energy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 427, 431 (1990) (concluding that “in the long run the
evolution of competition, in both the electric and gas industries, should do more to relieve than to
exacerbate state/federal tensions”).
16. Nordhaus, supra note 3, at 212.
17. See infra subpart II(C) (discussing cases from the Third, Fourth, and D.C. Circuits).
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energy security, and monitoring anticompetitive conduct that is harmful to
consumers.18
But in law as in life, sometimes “[e]nding is better than mending.”19 In
this Article, I argue that, for all practical purposes, three recent Supreme
Court decisions abandon dual sovereignty as the primary organizing principle
for resolution of federalism disputes under energy statutes. As an alternative,
the Court has recognized agency authorization for concurrent federal–state
jurisdiction over many energy transactions. Concurrent jurisdiction
challenges regulators and courts to address anew basic questions about the
nature of regulatory jurisdiction, rather than fixating almost entirely on
defining the scope of spheres of sovereignty. Recognition of statutory
authorization for concurrent jurisdiction, an approach akin to what Abbe
Gluck calls “statutory federalism,”20 opens up possibilities for new energy
federalism arrangements such as dynamic federalism and cooperative
federalism.21 While there is little doubt that jurisdictional overlaps can
sometimes create problems of their own, the Supreme Court’s recent
opinions also clarify the statutory objective of closing regulatory gaps,
namely avoiding a “no man’s land” where neither federal nor state regulators
can effectively address problems in energy markets. Still, concurrent
jurisdiction will also present important new challenges for courts and energy
markets as new federalism institutions emerge. Adapting federal preemption
doctrine to this brave new world of energy federalism can help ease the
transition to new regulatory approaches and ensure that courts do not lose
sight of the core objective behind these statutes.
Part I introduces New Deal-era energy statutes, such as the FPA and the
NGA.22 At the time these statutes were adopted, it was widely perceived that
18. See Sharon B. Jacobs, Bypassing Federalism and the Administrative Law of Negawatts, 100
IOWA L. REV. 885, 890 (2015) (noting that FERC’s recent initiatives “have run up against limits on
federal jurisdiction in the FPA”); see also Steven Ferrey, Restructuring a Green Grid: Legal
Challenges to Accommodate New Renewable Energy Infrastructure, 39 ENVTL. L. 977, 1005 (2009)
(noting that states run into similar limits).
19. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD 33 (Amereon House 1979) (1932).
20. Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996, 1998 (2014).
21. See William Boyd & Ann E. Carlson, Accidents of Federalism: Ratemaking and Policy
Innovation in Public Utility Law, 63 UCLA L. REV. 810, 883–84 (2016) (emphasizing
experimentation and innovation benefits of horizontal-regulatory nonuniformity in the energy
sector); Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1679–80 (2015)
(presenting a model that operationalizes dynamic federalism theory in the climate- and cleanenergy-policy context); Hari M. Osofsky & Hannah J. Wiseman, Dynamic Energy Federalism, 72
MD. L. REV. 773, 807–40 (2013) (calling for a dynamic federalism model in the context of energy
law); Jim Rossi & Thomas Hutton, Federal Preemption and Clean Energy Floors, 91 N.C. L. REV.
1283, 1288, 1331 (2013) (arguing that cooperative federalism is consistent with the FPA); Giovanni
S. Saarman González, Note, Evolving Jurisdiction Under the Federal Power Act: Promoting Clean
Energy Policy, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1422, 1466–69 (2016) (arguing that leaving some jurisdictional
room over energy regulation to the states is advantageous for clean-energy policy).
22. This Article focuses its discussion on federalism principles in the regulation of energy
markets. A related debate concerns energy federalism in energy production. For a terrific
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Congress was legislating to close the “Attleboro23 gap” attributed to dormant
commerce clause limits on state regulation. Congress gave federal regulators
substantive and remedial tools to address this gap in interstate energy
markets, charging federal regulators with the task of prohibiting
discriminatory activities that harm consumers. But Congress also did not
intend to entirely displace state regulation. These statutes also contain
specific provisions that recognize the importance of preserving state
authority over activities such as electric power generation and distribution,
though courts have consistently interpreted these clauses narrowly rather than
applying a presumption against preemption.
Part II discusses the rise and historical reign of dual sovereignty in the
regulation of energy markets. Dual sovereignty reflected the constitutional
federalism principles against which Congress was legislating in the 1930s
and was reinforced by later judicial interpretations of the resulting statutes.
Taking inspiration from the Interstate Commerce Commission’s regulation
of railroad rates, the Supreme Court’s earliest decisions interpreting energy
statutes recognized comprehensive federal jurisdiction over wholesale
energy markets. Federal authority under these statutes was not only
recognized as plenary. Courts also began to treat it as exclusive,24 giving rise
to a jurisdictional divide between federal and state regulators. This brightline approach purported to promote clarity, consistency, and uniformity, with
courts routinely refereeing the balance of power in federal–state
jurisdictional disputes by identifying formalistic boundaries.25
discussion, see generally David B. Spence, Federalism, Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy
of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431 (2013).
23. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 89 (1927).
24. The distinction between “plenary” and “exclusive” authority is important, but the two terms
are often conflated in federalism discussions. Plenary power is absolute and comprehensive, but an
entity with plenary power may or may not choose to treat that power as exclusive. It may choose
to delegate power, as Congress often does in areas where it possesses plenary power (such as the
Commerce Clause), or not to exercise it at all. See, e.g., Cal. Bankers Ass’n. v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,
59 (1974) (acknowledging the well-established authority of Congress to delegate its plenary powers
to regulate foreign commerce). If a court treats plenary authority as exclusive, it effectively takes
away an important feature of plenary power, which is the option to delegate it elsewhere or to share
it through inaction. The only other substantive area where courts have treated the national
government’s plenary authority as exclusive appears to be the federal power over immigration
matters. See Kerry Abrams, Plenary Power Preemption, 99 VA. L. REV. 601, 637, 639 (2013)
(identifying a phenomenon similar to exclusive authority in the context of immigration matters, but
labeling it “plenary power preemption”).
25. As Justice Brennan once observed:
Maintaining the proper balance between federal and state authority in the regulation of
electric and other energy utilities has long been a serious challenge to both judicial and
congressional wisdom. On the one hand, the regulation of utilities is one of the most
important of the functions traditionally associated with the police power of the States.
On the other hand, the production and transmission of energy is an activity particularly
likely to affect more than one State, and its effect on interstate commerce is often
significant enough that uncontrolled regulation by the States can patently interfere with
broader national interests.
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In Part III, I argue that, while dual sovereignty has had a long reign,
recent Supreme Court decisions abandon it as the primary federalism
principle under energy statutes. The Court first signaled fading of the
jurisdictional bright line in New York v. FERC,26 a 2002 opinion that
observed that changes in the landscape of the electric industry call into
question whether the electricity universe is “‘neatly divided in spheres of
retail versus wholesale sales.’”27 ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc.,28 decided in
2015, puts it even more starkly when it calls a “clear division between areas
of state and federal authority” a “platonic ideal” that eludes modern naturalgas markets.29 The Court’s 2016 opinion in FERC v. Electric Power Supply
Ass’n (EPSA),30 upheld FERC’s rules for compensating demand response
while departing from a strict notion of dual sovereignty and instead favoring
a concurrent jurisdiction framework.31
Justice Scalia vigorously dissented from this approach, claiming that the
majority’s shift away from dual sovereignty in ONEOK smudges the line for
determining jurisdiction and makes a “snarl” out of the Court’s precedents.32
His last published dissent in EPSA also takes issue with the basic idea of
concurrent jurisdiction.33 Still, I maintain, nothing in the structure or
language of New Deal-era energy statutes requires dual sovereignty for all
energy transactions that affect wholesale sales. Moreover, I maintain, for
many modern energy transactions related to wholesale energy markets,
recognizing agency authorization for concurrent jurisdiction better advances
the primary objective of these statutes, which is to close regulatory gaps
rather than eliminate jurisdictional overlaps.
In Part IV, I address the new challenges that concurrent jurisdiction and
cooperative federalism under energy statutes present for courts. First and
most importantly, as the Supreme Court stated in its 2016 EPSA decision,
regulation of modern energy markets can benefit from recognition that
concurrent jurisdiction is sometimes necessary to prevent new forms of

Ark. Elec. Coop. Corp. v. Ark. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 375, 377 (1983) (citation omitted).
26. 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
27. Id. at 16 (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 691 (D.C.
Cir. 2000)).
28. 135 S. Ct. 1591 (2015).
29. Id. at 1601.
30. 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
31. Id. at 776, 784 (“It is a fact of economic life that the wholesale and retail markets in
electricity, as in every other known product, are not hermetically sealed from each other. . . . When
FERC sets a wholesale rate, when it changes wholesale-market rules, when it allocates electricity
as between wholesale purchasers—in short, when it takes virtually any action respecting wholesale
transactions—it has some effect, in either the short or the long term, on retail rates. That is of no
legal consequence.”).
32. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1603, 1606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
33. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 787–88 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I cannot imagine a more irrational
interpretive principle than the following, upon which the majority evidently relies . . . .”).
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regulatory gaps. Some maintain that resolution of these energy federalism
disputes will ultimately require courts to fit energy transactions into a fixed
category of either federal or state jurisdiction.34 But an either/or mindset in
approaching federalism can also undermine the legislative purpose of
avoiding a regulatory “no man’s land.” Although recent cases such as EPSA
draw on this purpose to recognize expansive federal power, they also provide
a symmetry for energy federalism. Since federal authority is not exclusive,
it supports state experimentation in many instances too. For example, in
many energy markets where FERC actively regulates wholesale transactions,
states still retain considerable authority to adopt incentives for clean-energy
resources, even after the Supreme Court’s decision finding preemption of
state incentives for natural-gas plants last term in Hughes v. Talen Energy
Marketing, LLC.35 I also argue that EPSA’s novel endorsement of FERC’s
demand response rules as “a program of cooperative federalism”36 recognizes
a considerable range of institutional options for federalism, from providing
states an opportunity to “opt out” of federal programs (as has occurred with
demand response) to allowing federal regulators to preempt state regulations
that impede interstate energy markets.
For concurrent jurisdiction to enable agency efforts like these, courts
approaching energy preemption issues must also be attentive to dual
sovereignty’s doctrinal relics. Cases such as ONEOK and EPSA reveal the
folly of field-preemption approaches for modern energy markets and the need
to fundamentally rethink preemption analysis.
In recognizing that
jurisdiction can expand or contract based on factual and pragmatic
considerations, and is not a fixed legal category, courts must more clearly
address how these statutes limit the scope of federal authority, without
appealing to empty fictions of sovereignty that can crowd out state and local
incentives for new energy resources. While the Court’s recent decision in
Hughes found federal preemption of state incentives for new power
generation, importantly it did not adopt a categorical approach to preemption.
Rather, it only prohibits state regulation that targets or aims directly at a per

34. See, e.g., Ferrey, supra note 21, at 1003–08 (assuming that states will have to skate around
the bright line created by the FPA in order to effectively regulate carbon emissions and develop
feed-in tariffs to promote renewable energy); Jacobs, supra note 18, at 889 (advocating that federal
regulators strategically bypass traditional jurisdictional lines set up by the FPA); Nordhaus, supra
note 3, at 213 (advocating “legislative changes that redraw the Bright Line in a fashion that better
accommodates today’s regulatory needs”).
35. 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (striking down Maryland’s program to incentivize investments
in natural-gas plants on the grounds that it “invades FERC’s regulatory turf” by “adjusting an
interstate wholesale rate”); id. at 1299 (distinguishing Maryland’s program from other state
programs which encourage “production of new or clean generation through measures ‘untethered
to a generator’s wholesale market participation’”).
36. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 780.
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se just and reasonable wholesale rate.37 Thus, even after Hughes, courts
should be wary of extending categorical approaches to preemption to state
regulation of modern energy transactions, absent a careful assessment of the
foundational facts regarding the interoperation of federal and state regulation.
Finally, the significance of these foundational facts in resolving jurisdictional
questions underscores a need to encourage institutional arrangements and
procedures that enable agency (rather than judicial) preemption decisions.
Agency decision-making functions as a more democratic and dynamic way
of coordinating federal and state regulation of energy markets.
My ultimate claim is not that jurisdictional lines that avoid regulatory
overlaps are a bad idea or are always inconsistent with energy statutes.
Rather, the foundational facts that once sustained a clear jurisdictional
separation between federal and state regulators in the energy sector have
simply changed. Given these new factual conditions, it is more important
than ever before that courts recognize that dual sovereignty no longer serves
as the primary organizing paradigm for all energy transactions closely tied to
the wholesale market. Concurrent jurisdiction can serve as the organizing
principle for many modern energy transactions, especially as new
technologies and new kinds of energy resources are providing value for the
energy system. Such an approach can encourage state policy innovation
while also allowing federal-agency regulators an expansive role in setting
guiding principles, including the authority to preempt state regulation that
impedes federal market policies. Unlike former judicial precedents that rely
on dual sovereignty, the Court’s recent decisions do not dictate a single
federalism approach for all problems in energy regulation. Rather,
concurrent jurisdiction emboldens political institutions, rather than courts, to
consider and make decisions about the federalism balance in regulation of
interstate energy transactions.
I.

The New Deal-Era Statutory Framework

Congress adopted the FPA in 1935 and the NGA in 1938 to close the
regulatory gaps the Constitution imposed on states regulating interstate
energy markets beyond their borders. In this section, I present the primary
historical problem Congress was aiming to solve in these statutes. I also
introduce the primary statutory authority and regulatory tools Congress gave
federal regulators to address interstate energy markets. Congress recognized
substantial state authority in these statutes too, but the Supreme Court has
narrowly interpreted any authority reserved exclusively to states.

37. See Hughes, 1326 S. Ct. at 1298 (noting states may not achieve ends through “measures
aimed directly at” FERC-regulated wholesale markets) (quoting ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599); id. at
1299 (“We reject Maryland’s program only because it disregards an interstate wholesale rate
required by FERC.”).
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Closing Regulatory Gaps

The FPA and NGA were adopted to address the regulatory void
presented if interstate energy markets (primarily served at the time by stateregulated electric utility and gas-supply monopolies) were left unregulated
by the federal government. Section 201 of the FPA extends federal
jurisdiction to the FPC (FERC’s predecessor) to regulate “the sale of electric
energy at wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .”38 Almost identical
language appears in the NGA, which provides that its provisions “shall apply
to the transportation of natural gas in interstate commerce” and to “the sale
in interstate commerce of natural gas for resale . . . .”39
Based on this language, federal jurisdiction over wholesale sales of
energy is the starting point for understanding the statutory framework that
governs the operation of energy markets. Importantly, by granting federal
regulators authority to regulate wholesale sales, these statutes do not
authorize federal regulation of retail sales of energy. Thus, it is important to
note that in adopting both the FPA and the NGA, Congress did not give a
federal agency comprehensive authority to set rates to protect all consumers,
both wholesale and retail. Instead, Congress was aiming to extend federal
jurisdiction in order to avoid what at the time was a well-understood
regulatory void in interstate energy markets.
Prior to the adoption of the FPA in 1935, state commissions were
powerless to regulate any interstate transactions by electric utilities. The
Supreme Court recognized this limit on state power explicitly in Public
Utilities Commission v. Attleboro Steam & Electric Co. In that case, Rhode
Island’s Narragansett Electric Lighting Company had entered a twenty-year
contract to supply the full electricity requirements of the Massachusettsbased Attleboro Steam and Electric Company.40 The parties filed the contract
rate with the Public Utilities Commission of Rhode Island.41 Several years
later, Narragansett obtained a rate increase from the Rhode Island Public
Utilities Commission, over Attleboro’s objections.42
After this rate hike was appealed through the Rhode Island courts, the
Supreme Court granted certiorari.43 The majority rejected Rhode Island’s

38. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)). The FPA also extended federal jurisdiction to “the
transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce,” indicating that federal jurisdiction over
transmission is more expansive than federal jurisdiction over energy sales. Id.
39. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 717(b) (2012)).
40. Pub. Utils. Comm’n v. Attleboro Steam & Elec. Co., 273 U.S. 83, 84 (1927).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 85–86.
43. Id. at 83, 86.
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regulation of the rate for the sale of energy to a Massachusetts utility, citing
the Commerce Clause.44 Specifically, the Court highlighted:
[I]f Rhode Island could place a direct burden upon the interstate
business of the Narragansett Company because this would result in
indirect benefit to the customers of the Narragansett Company in
Rhode Island, Massachusetts could, by parity of reasoning, reduce the
rates on such interstate business in order to benefit the customers of
the Attleboro Company in that State, who would have, in the
aggregate, an interest in the interstate rate correlative to that of the
customers of the Narragansett Company in Rhode Island.45
According to the majority, the rate between Narragansett and Attleboro is
“not subject to regulation by either of the two states in the guise of protection
to their respective local interests; but, if such regulation is required it can only
be attained by the exercise of the power vested in Congress.”46 Thus, the
Court’s decision effectively disqualified both Massachusetts and Rhode
Island from regulating the rate of the electricity contract, leaving any
regulation of such prices to a nonexistent federal regime.
Less than a decade later, Congress would address this with the adoption
of the FPA. The statute’s legislative history makes clear that closing the
“Attleboro gap”—a regulatory void where neither the forwarding state nor
the receiving state could regulate the pricing of electricity sold across state
lines—was the legislation’s primary impetus.47 As the Supreme Court has

44. Id. at 89.
45. Id. at 90.
46. Id.
47. S. REP. NO. 74-621, at 17 (1935); H.R. REP. NO. 74-1318, at 7–8 (1935). The general
consensus was that, under Attleboro, the Commerce Clause denied the States power over any
wholesale transaction in interstate commerce. For confirmation, see generally Public Utility
Holding Company Act of 1935: Hearings on S. 1725 Before the S. Comm. on Interstate Commerce,
74th Cong. (1935) [hereinafter Senate Hearings] and Public Utility Holding Companies: Hearings
on H.R. 5423 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 74th Cong. (1935)
[hereinafter House Hearings]. The General Solicitor of the National Association of Railroad and
Utilities Commissioners said during the House hearings: “[Attleboro] has been accepted by
everybody as establishing . . . the fact that the State cannot regulate wholesale transactions, although
it can regulate retail service and rate.” House Hearings, supra, at 1657 (statement of John E.
Benton, General Solicitor, National Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners). At the
Senate hearings he said:
The second part of the bill [section 201(b)] provides for regulation by the Federal
Government of wholesale transactions in electric power. Those are transactions which
the United States Supreme Court has held are beyond the reach of the States under the
Constitution. The States have long regulated the rates charged by the local distributing
companies to consumers; but they cannot reach the interstate producer supplying the
distributing company.
Senate Hearings, supra, at 756–57 (statement of John E. Benton, General Solicitor, National
Association of Railroad and Utilities Commissioners). “It therefore follows that if there is to be any
regulation of the wholesale part of the electric and gas business which passes over State lines it must
be supplied by the Federal Government.” Id. at 768.
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noted, “Congress interpreted [Attleboro] as prohibiting state control of
wholesale rates in interstate commerce for resale.”48
In the 1920s, the Supreme Court imposed a similar constitutional limit
on state regulation of natural-gas sales,49 leading to the passage of the NGA
by Congress in 1938. Of course, modern-Dormant Commerce Clause
analysis does not follow the same formalisms that characterized the Court’s
pre-New Deal approach and is more likely to rely on pragmatic balancing.50
Despite this, the Court has continued to recognize closing regulatory gaps as
a primary objective behind (and the immediate impetus for) the FPA51—a
statutory purpose that has taken on a heightened importance in disputes in
modern energy markets.52
B.

Substantive and Remedial Regulatory Tools

In order to address this interstate regulatory void in energy markets,
Congress gave federal regulators a specific set of tools. A significant
problem associated with leaving interstate energy markets unregulated is the
risk of monopolistic market-pricing abuses by suppliers, which can harm

48. United States v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 345 U.S. 295, 308 (1953).
49. See Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kan. Nat. Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 307 (1924) (holding that
the Commerce Clause “restrains the states from imposing direct burdens upon interstate
commerce”).
50. See Post, supra note 4, at 1629–30 (relating the judicial method advanced by Justice Stone
during the New Deal era, balancing all relevant circumstances and governmental interests,
comparing that method to the approaches actually employed by the New Deal-era Court, and
observing that “Stone’s perspective on judicial technique has become our own”); see also Frank R.
Lindh, Federal Preemption of State Regulation in the Field of Electricity and Natural Gas: A
Supreme Court Chronicle, 10 ENERGY L.J. 277, 314 (1989) (noting that “the mechanical approach
to Commerce Clause questions in the older cases could produce seemingly arbitrary restrictions on
the otherwise lawful regulatory powers of the states”). For a discussion of modern-Dormant
Commerce Clause jurisprudence and its application to the energy sector, see generally Alexandra
B. Klass & Jim Rossi, Revitalizing Dormant Commerce Clause Review for Interstate Coordination,
100 MINN. L. REV. 129 (2015).
51. See, e.g., New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 6 (2002) (“When it enacted the FPA in 1935,
Congress authorized federal regulation of electricity in areas beyond the reach of state power, such
as the gap identified in Attleboro . . . .”) (footnote omitted); Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FPC,
319 U.S. 61, 67–68 (1943) (“The primary purpose of Title II [of the FPA] . . . was to give a federal
agency power to regulate the sale of electric energy across state lines. Regulation of such sales had
been denied to the states by [Attleboro].”); see also Duke Power Co. v. FPC, 401 F.2d 930, 934
(D.C. Cir. 1968) (“[I]t was primarily to fill the ‘Attleboro gap’ that Congress . . . passed the Federal
Power Act as its first exertion of national authority over the operating electric utilities.”) (footnote
omitted). For a critical discussion of Attleboro, see Sam Kalen, Muddling Through Modern Energy
Policy: The Dormant Commerce Clause and Unmasking the Illusion of an Attleboro Line, 24
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3), http://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2674292 [https://perma.cc/6T9E-RFGZ] (arguing that Attleboro was
dubious at the time it was decided and is especially dubious as a basis for drawing jurisdictional
lines today).
52. See discussion infra subpart IV(A).
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both competitors and consumers.53 Concerned with a similar issue in the
railroad context, Congress had previously vested the Interstate Commerce
Commission with broad authority to reject unjust, unreasonable, or
discriminatory rates.54
The FPA and NGA adopt a similar approach for energy markets,
assigning a federal agency—the FPC, FERC’s predecessor—the obligation
to ensure that utility or pipeline rates are not unjust, unreasonable, or
discriminatory. Section 205 of the FPA provides that “[a]ll rates” subject to
FERC’s jurisdiction along with “all rules and regulations affecting or
pertaining to such rates or charges shall be just and reasonable” and declares
that rates that do not meet this standard are unlawful.55 That section also
requires any utility subject to FERC’s jurisdiction to file any change in its
rates or related practices with FERC,56 and prohibits utilities from granting
an “undue preference or advantage,” subjecting any person to “undue
prejudice,” or maintaining any “unreasonable difference” in rates or “in any
other respect.”57 Section 206 provides that whenever FERC finds that a rate
for a jurisdictional sale or a “practice . . . affecting” the rate is “unjust,
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential,” FERC is obligated to
determine the appropriate rate.58
FERC’s sections 205 and 206 regulatory jurisdiction clearly extends to
the transmission as well as some sales of electricity (wholesale energy sales
under section 201).59 I refer to this as FERC’s substantive jurisdiction over
wholesale energy sales. Importantly, however, the “practice . . . affecting”
rates language in both sections 205 and 206 indicates that Congress also

53. For a discussion of these harms, see Erwin L. Davis, The Influence of the Federal Trade
Commission’s Investigations on Federal Regulations of Interstate Electric and Gas Utilities, 14
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 21, 23 (1945).
54. See Hepburn Act, ch. 3591, sec. 4, § 15, 34 Stat. 584, 589 (1906). For discussion of how,
in the adoption of the Interstate Commerce Act, Congress was also aiming to address a similar
federalism problem with interstate railroad rates, see generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory
Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017, 1054–70
(1988).
55. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 205(a), 49 Stat. 838, 851 (1935) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012)).
56. Id. at sec. 213, § 205(d), 49 Stat. at 851 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(d)
(2012)).
57. Id. at sec. 213, § 205(b), 49 Stat. at 851 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(b)
(2012)).
58. Id. at sec. 213, § 206(a), 49 Stat. at 852 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012)).
59. Id. at sec. 213, § 205(a), 49 Stat. at 851 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012))
(“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any public utility for or in connection with
the transmission or sale of electric energy subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . shall be
just and reasonable . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. sec. 213 § 206(a), 49 Stat. at 852 (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a) (2012)) (“Whenever the Commission . . . shall find that any
rate . . . for any transmission or sale subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission . . . is unjust,
unreasonable, unduly discriminatory or preferential, the Commission shall determine the just and
reasonable rate . . . .” (emphasis added)).
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intended FERC to have remedial jurisdiction over discriminatory market
conduct that is not, itself, a wholesale energy sale.60 This distinction between
substantive jurisdiction over the rates for wholesale energy sales and
remedial jurisdiction over “practices . . . affecting” rates is not unique to
electricity regulation.
Nearly identical language appears in the NGA.61 Courts have read the
FPA and NGA in pari materia to suggest that this language provides
extensive federal authority over the interstate energy markets.62 Notably too,
Congress was not writing on a blank slate when it adopted these statutes. As
Joel Eisen has shown, the substantive and remedial provisions of these energy
statutes were based on language of the Interstate Commerce Act, which also
contained “practices . . . affecting” remedial jurisdiction.63
Courts
interpreted the FPA’s and NGA’s remedial provisions as allowing broad
preemption of state regulation of utility investment and operational decisions,
especially where state regulation threatened to contravene federally approved
rates.64
C.

Impacts on State Regulation

Congress adopted this structure for federal regulation of energy markets
against the backdrop of existing (and, at the time, expanding) state regulation
of energy sales. At the time, and even today, states regulate utility sales to
retail consumers. While expansive federal power is undeniable under these
statutes, it bears noting that in both the FPA and NGA Congress envisioned
a significant, continued role for state regulation. These statutes contain
general policy statements regarding continued state regulation, as well as
60. See Joel B. Eisen, FERC’s Expansive Authority To Transform the Electric Grid, 49 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1783, 1795–96 (2016) (describing the ability to set wholesale rates and remedy
discriminatory practices affecting wholesale rates as the pillars of FERC’s authority under the FPA).
61. See Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 4(a), 52 Stat. 821, 822 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 717c(a) (2012)) (“All rates and charges made, demanded, or received by any natural-gas
company for or in connection with the transportation or sale of natural gas subject to the jurisdiction
of the Commission, and all rules and regulations affecting or pertaining to such rates or charges,
shall be just and reasonable, and any such rate or charge that is not just and reasonable is declared
to be unlawful.”); id. § 5(a), 52 Stat. at 823–24 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717d(a))
(“Whenever the Commission, after a hearing had upon its own motion or upon complaint of any
State, municipality, State commission, or gas distributing company, shall find that any rate, charge,
or classification demanded, observed, charged, or collected by any natural-gas company in
connection with any transportation or sale of natural gas, subject to the jurisdiction of the
Commission, or that any rule, regulation, practice, or contract affecting such rate, charge, or
classification is unjust, unreasonable, unduly discriminatory, or preferential, the Commission shall
determine the just and reasonable rate, charge, classification, rule, regulation, practice, or contract
to be thereafter observed and in force, and shall fix the same by order . . . .”).
62. See, e.g., Ky. Util. Co. v. FERC, 760 F.2d 1321, 1325 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (“It is, of course,
well settled that the comparable provisions of the Natural Gas Act and the Federal Power Act are to
be construed in pari materia.”).
63. Eisen, supra note 60, at 1797–1812.
64. See infra subpart II(B).
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more specific clauses that limit federal authorization and preserve state
power.
For example, section 201(a) of the FPA states that federal regulation
under the statute shall “extend only to those matters which are not subject to
regulation by the States.”65 In its plain language, this clause might be taken
to mean that, as of 1935, Congress meant to freeze in place the scope of
existing state regulation. Since the 1940s, however, the Supreme Court has
consistently interpreted section 201(a) as “prefatory” in nature, a “mere
policy declaration” that “cannot nullify a clear and specific grant of
jurisdiction, even if the particular grant seems inconsistent with the broadly
expressed purpose.”66
Elsewhere in the FPA, Congress spoke more directly to areas where
state regulation can continue without any federal interference. For example,
under section 201(b) of the FPA, Congress stated that, while FERC has
jurisdiction over all “facilities” for the transmission or wholesale sale of
energy, it does not have any jurisdiction over facilities “used for the
generation of electric energy,” or facilities “used in local distribution or only
for the transmission of electric energy in intrastate commerce,” or “facilities
for the transmission of electric energy consumed wholly by the transmitter.”67
The language of the NGA is similar, clearly exempting specific facilities
from the reach of federal regulation. For example, it states that federal
regulation does not extend to “facilities” used for the “local distribution” or
for “production or gathering” of gas.68 These provisions, which address
specific facilities, appear to speak to some sphere of exclusive state authority.
Beyond these specific facilities that are clearly reserved to the states,
both the FPA and NGA limit the transactions that FERC is authorized to
regulate. Section 201(b) of the FPA notes that its provisions do not apply to
“any other sale,” other than interstate transmission and the “sale of electric
energy at wholesale.”69 The NGA also states that its provisions only apply
to interstate transportation or wholesale sales.70

65. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012)).
66. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 22 (2002) (quoting FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S.
205, 215 (1964)); see also Jersey Cent. Power & Light Co. v. FPC, 319 U.S. 61, 74–77 (1943)
(rejecting section 201(a) as a limit on express authority granted to federal regulators elsewhere in
the FPA).
67. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. at 847–48 (codified as amended at
16 U.S.C. § 824(b) (2012)).
68. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 717(b) (2012)).
69. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. at 847 (codified as amended at 16
U.S.C. § 824(b)).
70. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. at 821 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 717(b)).
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In a case that has since been reversed by the Supreme Court, a D.C.
Circuit panel recently interpreted section 201 of the FPA as providing states
an exclusive sphere of jurisdiction over retail sales.71 While a strong
endorsement of dual sovereignty, this approach is inconsistent with other
judicial decisions that interpret section 201 narrowly and refuse to find a clear
reservation of exclusive authority for states over retail sales. For example, a
2002 Supreme Court decision upholding FERC’s competitive restructuring
of wholesale electric power markets refused to apply a presumption against
preemption to limit federal jurisdiction under the FPA.72 That opinion also
recognized that the starting place for determining whether federal power may
be exercised in an area of preexisting state regulation “is to examine the
nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency”73—an
approach that the Supreme Court endorsed even more strongly in its 2016
EPSA opinion, which I return to below.74
II.

Dual Sovereignty’s Reign

Courts have been repeatedly asked to address disputes surrounding the
scope of federal regulatory authority over energy markets. Until recent years,
judicial decisions addressing federalism did not dwell on the nature of federal
jurisdiction under energy statutes. Rather, in the immediate years following
enactment of these statutes, the Supreme Court quickly settled on a dual
sovereignty approach that depended upon the judiciary to set a bright line
separating spheres of federal and state jurisdiction. Courts applying this
approach routinely characterized federal authority as “plenary,” inviting
many confused discussions of jurisdiction under the FPA and NGA.
Initial decisions drew on Interstate Commerce Act precedents to project
a dual sovereignty approach onto these statutes. The common doctrinal
reasoning used to support this was that federal regulators “occupy the field”
of wholesale energy sales. Courts began to treat Congress’s delegations of
authority to agencies as not only plenary (or comprehensive), but as an
endorsement of exclusive sovereignty. Applying this approach, federal
courts rejected a broad range of subnational regulatory initiatives that
conflicted with federally approved wholesale energy prices, including
antitrust, tort, and breach of contract claims, under what is known as the
“filed rate doctrine.”75 These courts also extended the reach of dual
71. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 224 (D.C. Cir. 2014), rev’d, FERC v.
Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
72. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18, 25–28 (2002).
73. Id. at 18 (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)).
74. See infra subpart III(B).
75. The filed rate doctrine “holds that interstate power rates filed with FERC or fixed by FERC
must be given binding effect by state utility commissions determining intrastate rates.” Nantahala
Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 962 (1986). For a critique of courts’ tendency to
invoke the filed rate doctrine, see Rossi, supra note 6, at 1642–46.
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sovereignty beyond federal authority over actual wholesale energy sales,
sometimes treating “practices . . . affecting” rates as within the exclusive
authority of federal regulators.
After presenting dual sovereignty’s reign and its implications for
federalism under energy statutes, I present some prominent modern examples
of how lower courts have continued to rely on bright-line jurisdictional
analysis to make sweeping jurisdictional conclusions about energy statutes
without any careful analysis of foundational facts surrounding the operation
of energy markets. Dual sovereignty continues to cast a shadow upon
regulation of modern energy markets, affecting state initiatives for customer
energy resources and state incentives for new, low-carbon power generation
facilities. These examples present an important opportunity for courts to
clarify the role of foundational facts in sustaining federal regulation of energy
markets.
A.

The Tradition of “Bright Line” Jurisdiction

Following the adoption of New Deal-era energy statutes, courts initially
interpreted the scope of federal regulatory authority in an expansive manner.
Federal jurisdiction under energy statutes found a parallel in Justice
Brandeis’s interpretation of similar language from the Interstate Commerce
Act, which held that state railroad regulation was field preempted. This
rather formalistic approach endorsed dual sovereignty’s premise that federal
and state regulators occupy distinct spheres of regulatory jurisdiction.
A 1926 opinion written by Justice Brandeis—who six years later penned
his famous dissent celebrating states as laboratories of democracy76—stands
as one of the strongest field-preemption rulings under an economicregulation statute. In Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co.,77 the
Supreme Court held that Congress intended to “occupy the field” of railroad
safety when it delegated the authority to regulate it to the Interstate
Commerce Commission under the Boiler Inspection Act (adopted in 1911).78
In rejecting state safety regulations for railroad employees, Justice Brandeis
wrote for a unanimous Court:
It is also urged that, even if the Commission has power to prescribe an
automatic firebox door and a cab curtain, it has not done so; and that
it has made no other requirement inconsistent with the state legislation.
This, also, if true, is without legal significance. The fact that the
Commission has not seen fit to exercise its authority to the full extent
conferred, has no bearing upon the construction of the Act delegating
the power. We hold that state legislation is precluded, because the
Boiler Inspection Act, as we construe it, was intended to occupy the
76. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
77. 272 U.S. 605 (1926).
78. Id. at 611–13; Boiler Inspection Act, ch. 103, 36 Stat. 913 (1911) (amended 1915).
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field. The broad scope of the authority conferred upon the
Commission leads to that conclusion. Because the standard set by the
Commission must prevail, requirements by the States are precluded,
however commendable or however different their purpose.79
Napier’s form of field preemption finds exclusive federal jurisdiction based
entirely on the delegation of broad regulatory authority to an agency without
any additional evaluation of congressional intent or how an agency actually
regulates an activity. Justice Brandeis considered this a groundbreaking
decision, heralding it as a statutory-construction doctrine of preemption
unless Congress states otherwise, something akin to a presumption favoring
agency preemption.80
Napier has never been overruled. The decision influenced the post-New
Deal Court’s expansion of federal preemption under a number of statutes.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.81 echoed Napier’s basic principle, holding
that the relevant test for the displacement of state law is “whether the matter
on which the State asserts the right to act is in any way regulated by the
Federal Act.”82
Rice and later cases recognize additional factors that are also relevant to
any judicial finding of federal preemption—including how “pervasive” the
actual scheme of regulation is.83 Under statutes such as the FPA and NGA,
however, courts have made broad findings of preemption based on the simple
fact of delegation, with little additional evidence that Congress intended
regulation to be pervasive or that state regulation was inconsistent with the
approach of federal regulators.84 Under these statutes, courts recognized that
Congress’s broad delegation of authority to agency regulators created plenary
federal jurisdiction over wholesale energy markets. A bright-line approach
to the federal–state division reinforces this idea and has continued to

79. Napier, 272 U.S. at 613 (emphasis added).
80. Justice Brandeis wrote to Felix Frankfurter the day after the Napier decision was issued:
In [Napier] I have endeavored to make clear, as a matter of statutory construction, the
“occupying the field” doctrine. I think the states could be taught, by a similar ABC
article that, if they wish to preserve their police power, they should, through the “state
block” in Congress, see to it in every class of Congressional legislation that the state
rights which they desire to preserve be expressly provided for in the acts.
Letter from Louis Brandeis to Felix Frankfurter (Nov. 30, 1926), in “HALF BROTHER, HALF SON”:
THE LETTERS OF LOUIS D. BRANDEIS TO FELIX FRANKFURTER 262, 263 (Melvin I. Urofsky &
David W. Levy eds., 1991).
81. 331 U.S. 218 (1947).
82. Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
83. As the Court stated in Rice, a purpose to preempt can be evidenced in many ways: the
scheme of federal regulation may be “so pervasive so as to make reasonable the inference that
Congress left no room for the States to supplement it,” the federal interest may be “so dominant that
the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject,” or
“the object sought to be obtained by the federal law and the character of obligations imposed by it
may reveal the same purpose.” Id. at 230.
84. See infra subpart II(B).
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encourage both courts and regulators to treat as exclusive the authority
delegated to federal regulators.85 This approach was widely perceived as
reinforcing a fixed jurisdictional line that promised to resolve federalism
questions “in a consistent and predictable manner.”86
For example, one of the Supreme Court’s earliest decisions interpreting
the NGA claims that Congress “has given plenary authority [to a federal
agency] to regulate extensions of gas transportation facilities and their
physical connection with those of distributors, as well as the sale of gas to
them.”87 The most famous formulation of this approach is what has come to
be known as the bright-line jurisdictional test:
The line of the statute was thus clear and complete. It cut sharply and
cleanly between sales for resale and direct sales for consumptive uses.
No exceptions were made in either category for particular uses,
quantities or otherwise. And the line drawn was that one at which the
decisions had arrived in distributing regulatory power before the Act
was passed.88
This dual sovereignty approach endorsed a legalistic test that, in effect, gave
federal regulators the exclusive authority to regulate wholesale sales of gas,
while relegating state regulators jurisdiction over retail sales.89
Nearly two decades later, in interpreting the FPA, the Court elaborated
that electric power markets also contain a jurisdictional bright line, dividing
federal and state regulatory authority based on the nature of the activity:
Congress meant to draw a bright line easily ascertained, between state
and federal jurisdiction, making unnecessary such case-by-case
analysis [of conflicts]. This was done in the Power Act by making
FPC jurisdiction plenary and extending it to all wholesale sales in
interstate commerce except those which Congress has made explicitly
subject to regulation by the States.90
Again, in describing federal authority as “plenary,” the Court meant to
describe federal authority under the statute as comprehensive, if not
exclusive. On this approach, the effect of finding any federal authority over
wholesale energy markets was typically to field preempt state regulation.
B.

Field Preemption of Traditional Rate Regulation

One of the highest profile modern endorsements of field preemption is
in the context of nuclear regulation. In Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State
85. See infra subpart II(C).
86. Lindh, supra note 50, at 278.
87. Ill. Nat. Gas Co. v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498, 510 (1942).
88. Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517 (1947).
89. For a discussion of the competing views on this subject, see Clinton A. Vince & John S.
Moot, Federal Preemption Versus State Utility Regulation in a Post-Mississippi Era, 10 ENERGY
L.J. 1, 4–5 (1989).
90. FDC v. S. Cal. Edison, 376 U.S. 205, 215–16 (1964).
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Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,91 the Supreme
Court held that a California statute authorizing state regulation of the
economic aspects of nuclear generating plants was not preempted by the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954.92 The Court noted that under the Atomic Energy
Act, federal regulators “maintain[] complete control of the safety and
‘nuclear’ aspects of energy generation.”93 “[T]he Federal Government has
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety concerns,” the Court reasoned, but
“the [California] statute does not seek to regulate the construction or
operation of a nuclear powerplant”94 so it was not preempted. Unlike a state
moratorium on nuclear construction for safety reasons, which would fall
squarely within the prohibited field, the California law did not fall to
preemption because, the Court concluded, it “was aimed at economic
problems, not radiation hazards.”95
As the Court’s Pacific Gas & Electric’s analysis indicates, modern field
preemption doctrine has departed from the approach Justice Brandeis
endorsed in Napier. Rather than focusing on the sweeping scope of a
congressional delegation to federal regulators as fixing an exclusive sphere
of federal authority, modern preemption analysis focuses on the aim of state
regulation.96 From this alone, it might appear that the modern Court disfavors
a strong presumption in favor of preemption, giving states considerable
leeway to regulate without interfering with federal policies, as occurred with
nuclear regulation. Yet, two subsequent decisions from the 1980s make
broad field-preemption findings under energy statutes, showing how Justice
Brandeis’s approach in Napier has continued to wield influence. Close
analysis of these cases reveals dual sovereignty’s continued reign over energy
federalism and a Court struggling with its fixation on divining a clear
statutory divide between federal and state authority.
In its 1986 decision in Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg,97
the Supreme Court found field preemption of state retail-rate regulation that
contravened FERC-approved wholesale power rates.98 There, two wholly
owned subsidiary companies, Nantahala and Tapoco, each sold hydroelectric
power they produced to the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA).99 In
exchange, Nantahala and Tapoco jointly received a fixed supply of low-cost
“entitlement power” from the TVA.100 In a wholesale ratemaking
91. 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
92. Id. at 205, 216.
93. Id. at 212.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 213.
96. See subpart III(b) and Part IV.
97. 476 U.S. 953 (1986).
98. Id. at 959–62, 966.
99. Id. at 954–55.
100. Id. at 955.
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proceeding, FERC set the allocation of this “entitlement power” Nantahala
would receive.101 North Carolina regulators, for the purposes of calculating
the rate that Nantahala could charge its retail customers, chose a different
entitlement allocation, rejecting FERC’s methodology.102 This approach for
setting retail rates was upheld by the North Carolina Supreme Court.103
On review the U.S. Supreme Court reversed, applying what is known as
the “filed rate doctrine,” an obscure regulatory principle aimed at “enforcing
the Supremacy Clause.”104 Nantahala invoked precedents involving rate
approval by the Interstate Commerce Commission, suggesting that federal
regulation is “supreme and exclusive.”105 It also noted that precedents
involving both electric and gas regulation “uniformly” recognize “the need
to enforce the exclusive jurisdiction vested by Congress in FERC over the
regulation of interstate wholesale utility rates.”106 Under the FPA, the Court
reasoned, “FERC clearly has exclusive jurisdiction over the rates to be
charged . . . interstate wholesale customers.”107
Significantly, the Nantahala court observed, the pragmatic reach of the
filed rate doctrine “is not limited to ‘rates’ per se”108 but also includes
practices that “directly affect[]” wholesale rates, such as the allocation of the
amount of low-cost hydroelectric power.109 Because the effect of the North
Carolina ruling would be to “trap[]” FERC-approved wholesale costs, it
would deny Nantahala the ability to fully recover its costs of purchasing at a
FERC-approved rate.110 Thus, the Supreme Court rejected the North
Carolina ruling.111
A year later, the Court again relied on the filed rate doctrine to preempt
a state proceeding in Mississippi Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel.
Moore.112 There, the Court held that an order requiring an electric utility to
purchase a portion of the nuclear plant’s output at FERC-determined rates
preempted state inquiry into management decisions leading to the
construction of the nuclear plant.113

101. Id.
102. Id. at 959–60.
103. Id. at 961.
104. Id. at 963, 973.
105. Id. at 964 (citing Chicago & Nw. Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311
(1981) (quoting Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Stroud, 267 U.S. 404, 408 (1925))).
106. Id. at 965–66.
107. Id. at 966 (emphasis added).
108. Id.
109. Id. at 967.
110. Id. at 970.
111. Id. at 971–73.
112. 487 U.S. 354 (1988).
113. Id. at 356–57, 369–70.
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These applications of the filed rate doctrine to find plenary preemption
of electric-power regulation involving wholesale rates were followed by an
even more sweeping invocation of field preemption to FERC’s regulation of
interstate-gas markets. In Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co.,114 the Court
also recognized that the NGA constitutes a “comprehensive scheme of
federal regulation of ‘all wholesales of natural gas in interstate
commerce.’”115 The Court reasoned that FERC’s authority to set just and
reasonable rates “permits [the agency] to control, albeit indirectly, a naturalgas company’s capital structure.”116 It also highlighted that the requirement
that FERC issue a “certificate of public convenience and necessity” for any
new facility for the transport or sale of gas in interstate commerce provides
the agency broad authority to ensure a project is financed in accordance with
the public interest.117 To the extent that a Michigan law was intended to
protect against overcapitalization and excessive rates for facilities that are “a
critical part” of the transportation of and interstate market in natural gas, the
Court reasoned, the law was “an attempt to regulate matters within FERC’s
exclusive jurisdiction.”118
The Supreme Court’s approach to field preemption in these decisions
relied on a number of routine aphorisms that served to sustain dual
sovereignty. For example, consider the oft-cited principle that FERC
possesses “plenary” authority over wholesale energy markets. Somewhat
dubiously, the Court took this to not only mean comprehensive (the standard
meaning of plenary in jurisdictional analysis). It also equated plenary with
“exclusive.”
Notable too, with no analysis, Nantahala and Schneidewind extend
FERC’s “exclusive” jurisdiction beyond the setting of wholesale rates. These
cases also include within the scope of field preemption any “practice . . .
affecting” rates where the aim of state regulation encroaches onto FERC’s
“exclusive purview.”119 The Court’s preemption findings under these
statutes paid little attention to actual foundational facts regarding the
operation of federal and state regulation in energy markets and made no effort
to distinguish FERC’s substantive jurisdiction over wholesale rates from its
remedial jurisdiction over “practices . . . affecting” rates.

114. 485 U.S. 293 (1988).
115. Id. at 300 (quoting N. Nat. Gas Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 372 U.S. 84, 91 (1963)
(quoting Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672, 682 (1954))).
116. Id. at 302.
117. Id. at 302–03.
118. Id. at 307–08.
119. Id. at 308; Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 956, 966. As the Court clarified in Schneidewind, “every
state statute that has some indirect effect on rates and facilities of natural-gas companies is not
preempted.” Schneidewind, 485 U.S. at 308. Instead, such preemption only extends to those state
laws with a “central purpose” of regulating “matters Congress intended FERC to regulate.” Id. at
308–09.
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Such unreflective applications of field preemption over wholesale
energy markets presumptively favored federal authority as a way of
advancing many pragmatic regulatory objectives. For example, under the
traditional approach to regulating vertically integrated utilities, both federal
and state authorities set rates based on similar consumer-protection and costof-service principles.120 Given these parallel policy goals, a presumption in
favor of federal preemption helped to ensure that costs were not trapped (and
left unrecoverable) while also making sure that utility shareholders did not
receive a windfall through overcompensation of their expenses.121
But, even with traditional utility regulation, the ability of dual
sovereignty to solve jurisdictional disputes based on a fixed-jurisdictional
line proved somewhat elusive.122
Contrary to Justice Brandeis’s
methodology in Napier, which eschews any case-by-case analysis, both
Nantahala and Schneidewind ultimately required courts to evaluate some
foundational facts regarding how specific state law interacts with federal
regulation in energy markets prior to a preemption finding. Thus, while
courts appealed to field preemption to support exclusive regulation of
wholesale energy markets under energy statutes, courts were ultimately
unable to avoid case-by-case determinations in addressing many of these
energy-federalism disputes.123
C.

Dual Sovereignty’s Modern Legacy

As modern energy markets have evolved, many courts addressing
federalism disputes continue to fixate on the formalisms of the jurisdictional
bright line. Courts continue to rely on fixed jurisdictional categories, even
as federal energy regulation has moved away from cost-of-service principles
to focus instead on competitive markets. Courts have routinely treated the
existence of a federally approved wholesale rate as categorically preempting
any state regulation of the same activity.124 Some courts have even found
preemption based on nothing more than a delegation to a federal regulator,
reasoning that federal authority forecloses the other regulator from

120. For descriptions of parallel-rate regulation of electric power until the 1980s, see generally
RICHARD F. HIRSCH, POWER LOSS: THE ORIGINS OF DEREGULATION AND RESTRUCTURING IN THE
AMERICAN ELECTRIC UTILITY SYSTEM (1999); PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE,
MARKETS FOR POWER: AN ANALYSIS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY DEREGULATION 13–20 (1983).
121. See Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 970–71 (observing the problem of “trapped” costs); Steven J.
Ferrey, Shaping American Power: Federal Preemption and Technological Change, 11 VA. ENVTL.
L.J. 47, 58–59 (1991) (same); Vince & Moot, supra note 89, at 29–30 (same).
122. A point highlighted nicely by Vince & Moot, supra note 89, at 4–5.
123. For further discussion of how courts had to develop exceptions and rely on case-by-case
analysis of specific tensions between federal and state regulators, see infra section IV(C)(1).
124. See Rossi, supra note 6, at 1605–10 (discussing preemption in the context of filed rate
claims).
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addressing the same market activity at all.125 These applications of dual
sovereignty rarely rely on a careful assessment of foundational facts
surrounding the operation of energy markets; rather, courts are more inclined
to rely on sweeping jurisdictional conclusions that all regulatory authority
lies on one side or the other of a fixed dividing line.
One high-profile illustration is the D.C. Circuit’s 2014 opinion rejecting
FERC’s regulation of compensation for “demand response”126 (commitments
not to consume electricity, also known as “negawatts”127) in interstate-power
markets, which was reversed by the Supreme Court in 2016.128 FERC’s rules
defined demand response as “a reduction in the consumption of electric
energy by customers from their expected consumption in response to an
increase in the price of electric energy or to incentive payments designed to
induce lower consumption of electric energy.”129 Importantly, by its very
definition, demand response is not a wholesale energy sale, which FERC
clearly would have jurisdiction to regulate under section 201 of the FPA.130
Instead, FERC based its statutory authority for these rules on its remedial
authority to ensure that “all rules and regulations affecting . . . rates” in
connection with the wholesale sales of energy are “just and reasonable” under
sections 205 and 206 of the FPA.131
The D.C. Circuit did not buy this argument, striking down FERC’s
demand response rule as ultra vires under the FPA.132 The panel decision,
written by Judge Janice Rogers Brown and joined by Judge Laurence
Silberman, reasoned that FERC’s rationale for jurisdiction “has no limiting
principle.”133 Without boundaries, sections 205 and 206 “could ostensibly
authorize FERC to regulate any number of areas, including the steel, fuel,
and labor markets.”134 FERC had maintained that a limit to the practicesaffecting jurisdictional argument was based on demand response providers

125. Id. at 1610–15 (discussing agency deference in the context of antitrust and the filed rate
doctrine).
126. EPSA v. FERC, 753 F.3d 216, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2014).
127. Id. at 225–30 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
128. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
129. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(b)(4) (2016).
130. See Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)) (“The provisions of this Part shall apply to . . . the sale
of electric energy at wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .”).
131. Id. at sec. 213, §§ 205–06; EPSA, 753 F.3d at 221.
132. EPSA, 753 F.3d at 225. The D.C. Circuit also held that FERC’s rule was arbitrary and
capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) because FERC failed to provide a “direct
response” to some of the arguments that FERC’s rule would overcompensate demand response,
resulting in discriminatory rates. Id. at 224–25. Importantly, the Supreme Court reversed the D.C.
Circuit, finding in favor of FERC on jurisdiction as well as the arbitrary-and-capricious inquiry and
upholding FERC’s demand response rules. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 773. For a full analysis of this case,
see infra subpart III(B).
133. EPSA, 753 F.3d at 221.
134. Id.
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choosing to participate in wholesale markets, but the D.C. Circuit
characterized this kind of effort to “lure” what would have been retail sales
into the wholesale market as “the heart of” the jurisdictional challenge before
the court.135
The D.C. Circuit panel went on to identify a specific jurisdictional
limitation on FERC’s authority in the FPA. Specifically, it referenced a
clause in section 201(a) of the FPA, which states that FERC’s reach
“extend[s] only to those matters which are not subject to regulation by the
States.”136 As a result of this clause, along with other language in 201(b) that
makes the FPA inapplicable to “any other sale” (other than wholesale
sales),137 the D.C. Circuit reasoned that “[s]tates retain exclusive authority to
regulate the retail market.”138 The court further explained that sections 205
and 206 do not constitute a “clear and specific grant of jurisdiction” that could
trump the specific limits in section 201 and effectively “render the retail
market prohibition useless.”139 Instead, the D.C. Circuit concluded,
“[b]ecause FERC’s rule entails direct regulation of the retail market—a
matter exclusively within state control—it exceeds the Commission’s
authority.”140
In another recent series of decisions surrounding state incentives for
power generation, lower courts have relied on dual sovereignty to support
sweeping federal preemption of state regulation. Traditionally, FERC
directly set rates for the sale of energy at wholesale. However, the interstate
energy market has shifted away from local monopolies, which dominated the
industry at the time of the FPA’s passage, to a system of interstate
competition.141 Under this approach, FERC has authorized the creation of
various “regional transmission organizations” (RTO)—multistate
institutions, which serve to coordinate organized energy markets in the most
populated areas of the United States.142 One of these is PJM Interconnected
(PJM), a voluntary RTO which administers a regional market that includes

135. Id. at 221–22.
136. Id. at 221 (quoting Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012))).
137. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)).
138. EPSA, 753 F.3d at 221.
139. Id. at 222.
140. Id. at 224. In a dissent, Judge Harry Edwards treated the jurisdictional issue as ambiguous
under the FPA and indicated that he would have deferred to FERC’s interpretation of the statute.
Id. at 227 (Edwards, J., dissenting).
141. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 5–8 (2002) (identifying legislative changes, technical
advances, and an increased number of electricity suppliers as the causes of the shift).
142. 18 C.F.R. § 35.28(g) (2016).
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Maryland.143 PJM operates a “real-time” energy market (enabling PJM to
buy and sell electricity for delivery to distributors within the next hour) and
a “day-ahead” market for power-generation capacity.144
In addition PJM operates a “capacity” market,145 which gives buyers an
option to purchase electricity in the future.146 In operating it, PJM sets a quota
based on how much capacity it predicts will be needed three years into the
future, and then relies on what is known as a Reliability Pricing Model (RPM)
to determine the appropriate per-unit price.147 This price reflects the highpriced bid, based on a PJM-managed auction.148 In approving PJM’s initial
capacity market, FERC endorsed a minimum-offer-price rule that required
new generators to bid at or above a specified price in certain circumstances,
in order to prevent the manipulation of market clearing prices through the
exercise of buyer market power; this decision potentially exempted certain
state-mandated power generators and allowed them to bid at zero.149
However, following a complaint lodged by several generators, FERC
eliminated the exemption for state-supported power plants and required these
plants to bid at the agency-specific minimum price.150 The agency reasoned
that this adjustment was necessary to protect the integrity of wholesale
capacity markets against below-cost bids by subsidized plants.151
143. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 974 F. Supp. 2d 790, 801 (D. Md. 2013), aff’d 753
F.3d 467 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288
(2016).
144. Id. at 804.
145. Capacity is “a standby commitment made by a capacity resource to either produce electric
energy or to consume less electric energy at a time in the future when called upon by PJM to do so.”
Id. at 806. Importantly, a capacity market is not the same as an energy market.
In a capacity market, in contrast to a wholesale energy market, an electricity provider
purchases from a generator an option to buy a quantity of energy, rather than
purchasing the energy itself. Accordingly, the purchase of capacity is the purchase of
a capacity resource’s availability either to supply energy . . . or to reduce the demand
for electric energy on the transmission system at some defined future time. A purchase
of capacity is not a purchase of actual electric energy, but is instead a purchase of a
resource capable of producing, or reducing demand for, electric energy in the
transmission system when requested.
Id. (internal quotations, footnotes, and citations omitted). Notably, both the FPA and NGA speak
only to FERC having direct jurisdiction over the wholesale sale of energy. Federal Power Act, ch.
687, sec. 213, § 201, 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824 (2012));
Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 717(b) (2012)). Still, even if capacity does not itself constitute a wholesale sale of energy, FERC
can potentially use its remedial jurisdiction over practices affecting energy rates to regulate the
capacity market.
146. PPL EnergyPlus, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 806.
147. Id. at 805–06.
148. Id. Under the RPM, auction participants bid to sell capacity for a single year, three years
in the future, and then PJM ranks the bids from highest to lowest and, starting at the bottom, accepts
bids until it has sufficient capacity to meet its quota. Id. at 806–12.
149. Id. at 809; PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 119 FERC ¶ 61,318, at para. 163 (2007).
150. PJM Interconnection, L.L.C., 137 FERC ¶ 61,145, at para. 93, 96 (2011).
151. Id.

ROSSI.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

The Brave New Path of Energy Federalism

12/2/2016 11:08 AM

425

The state of Maryland adopted competitive retail markets in 1999 and
authorized its utilities to participate in the PJM RTO.152 However, portions
of Maryland and D.C. are located in an area that the state of Maryland
believed to be at heightened “risk for reliability problems,” creating a need
for generation sources in these particular areas.153 Thus, the Maryland Public
Service Commission solicited proposals for a new power plant, offering the
successful bidder a twenty-year revenue stream secured by contracts for
differences.154 Competitors of the winning bidder for Maryland’s incentives
sued, alleging federal preemption of the Maryland incentives.155 A federal
district court agreed, finding that FERC’s order field preempts the Maryland
scheme, because the contracts-for-differences prices have the effect of setting
the ultimate price that the winning Maryland generator receives in the PJM
market.156
In a unanimous panel decision for the Fourth Circuit, Judge James
Harvie Wilkinson III affirmed the lower court holding that FERC regulation
of the interstate capacity market preempts the Maryland incentive
program.157 The court reasoned that the breadth of the grant of authority to
federal regulators, as stated in the FPA’s declaration of policy, “is confirmed
by the FPA’s similarly capacious substantive and remedial provisions” in
sections 205 and 206.158 Citing a “wealth of case law [that] confirms FERC’s
exclusive power to regulate wholesale sales of energy in interstate
commerce,”159 the court reasoned that “if FERC has jurisdiction over a
subject the States cannot have jurisdiction over the same subject.”160 The
court also highlighted that the Supreme Court has expressly rejected the
notion that the “scope of [FERC’s] jurisdiction . . . is to be determined by a
case-by-case analysis of the impact of state regulation upon the national
interest.”161 Instead, “Congress meant to draw a bright line easily
ascertained, between state and federal jurisdiction. . . . This was done in the
[FPA] by making [FERC] jurisdiction plenary and extending it to all
wholesale sales in interstate commerce except those which Congress has
made explicitly subject to regulation by the States.”162
152. PPL EnergyPlus, 974 F. Supp. 2d at 814–15.
153. Id. at 819–20.
154. Id. at 821–24.
155. Id. at 796.
156. Id. at 840.
157. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 471 (4th Cir. 2014), aff’d sub nom.
Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016).
158. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012)); PPL EnergyPlus, 753 F.3d at 474–75.
159. PPL EnergyPlus, 753 F.3d at 474–75.
160. Id. at 475 (quoting Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354,
377 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)).
161. Id. (quoting Nantahala Power & Light Co. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986)).
162. Id. (quoting Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 966).
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Applying these principles, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the
Maryland generation scheme was field preempted because it “functionally
sets the rate” that the winning bidder “receives for its sales in the PJM
auction.”163 Maryland regulators argued that the state does not actually set a
rate because it “does not directly affect the terms of any transaction in the
federal market.”164 However, in the view of the Fourth Circuit, allowing the
state’s scheme to stand “compromises the integrity of the federal scheme and
intrudes on FERC’s jurisdiction.”165 In support of this conclusion, the court
cited Supreme Court precedents that found federal preemption of state laws
that would have barred passing FERC-approved wholesale rates through to
customers.166 It also reasoned that conflict-preemption analysis reinforces a
finding of field preemption, because in its view the Maryland scheme
presents a “direct and transparent impediment to the functioning of the PJM
markets.”167
New Jersey, another state in PJM, with some of the highest power prices
in the country, adopted a similar set of incentives for new generators, known
as its Long-Term Capacity Agreement Pilot Program.168 These incentives
offered contracts to provide new electric generators fifteen years of revenue
from local utilities, which would be passed through to local ratepayers.169 As
with the Maryland scheme, New Jersey’s incentives resulted in a lawsuit by
competitors and a district court judgment in favor of the plaintiffs finding
conflict preemption.170 The Third Circuit, in a panel decision written by
Judge Julio Fuente, agreed with this result, and couched its decision in a fieldpreemption analysis.171 It noted that its decision is limited to “capacity
prices” in an “exclusively federal field” and does not speak to the issue of
conflict preemption.172 Despite the Third Circuit’s claim that capacity is
exclusively within the sphere of federal authority, it also mysteriously notes
that states still “may select the type of generation to be built[:] wind or solar,

163. Id. at 476.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. (citing Miss. Power & Light Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Moore, 487 U.S. 354 (1988);
Nantahala, 476 U.S. 953).
167. Id. at 479–80. However, the court also suggested that its conflict preemption holding is
narrow and “not every state regulation that incidentally affects federal markets is preempted.” Id.
at 479.
168. Everest Schmidt, Note, A Call for Federalism: The Role of State Government in Federally
Controlled Energy Markets, 65 RUTGERS L. REV. 573, 591–92 (2013).
169. Id. at 598–600.
170. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Hanna, 977 F. Supp. 2d 372 (D.N.J. 2013), aff’d on other
grounds sub nom. PPL EnergyPlus, LLC v. Solomon, 766 F.3d 241 (3d Cir. 2014).
171. PPL EnergyPlus, 766 F.3d at 255.
172. Id. at 254.
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gas or coal” and that “states may elect to build no electric generation facilities
at all.”173
Much like the D.C. Circuit’s rejection of FERC’s demand response
regulations, these appellate court cases strongly embrace the traditional dual
sovereignty paradigm for resolving federalism issues under the FPA. They
both fixate on a jurisdictional bright line under the FPA and characterize
FERC’s jurisdiction over interstate wholesale markets as “plenary” and, in
effect, exclusive. Their reasoning relies on an expansive notion of field
preemption even where the agency itself did not make any transparent finding
in a regulatory proceeding that the state incentives are discriminatory in
nature—a point I return to below.174 As Robert Nordhaus observes (in
criticizing the approach of the Third Circuit), “These cases are significant
because they go far beyond excluding ‘subsidized’ resources from capacity
markets—they bar their construction and operation altogether.”175 In its 2016
Hughes decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion
that Maryland’s incentives are preempted, but, as I discuss below, this case
and other recent decisions by the Court call into question whether a brightline approach to jurisdiction can resolve the federalism disputes confronting
modern energy markets.176
III. The Recent Rise of Concurrent Jurisdiction
Dual sovereignty has continued to create uncertainty and confusion
surrounding energy federalism in modern energy markets, calling into
question its ability to promote uniformity and certainty. This Part explores
how recent Supreme Court decisions reject dual sovereignty as the organizing
principle for energy federalism. These recent decisions endorse statutory
authorization for concurrent jurisdiction as the presumptive starting place for
addressing many federalism disputes in modern energy markets. Contrary to

173. Id. at 255. Although the court did not cite to the FPA as a basis for distinguishing between
incentives that are explicit and those that indirectly result from generation mandates, it appears to
be referencing a portion of the FPA that indicates that states, not the federal government, regulates
the generation of electricity. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847
(1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)); see PPL EnergyPlus, 766 F.3d at
255.
174. See infra section IV(C)(3).
175. Nordhaus, supra note 3, at 211.
176. Highlighting the significance of field preemption to these cases, the Solicitor General’s
invited brief opposing certiorari cited Kurns v. Railroad Friction Product Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261
(2012). Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC,
136 S. Ct. 1288 (Nos. 14-614, 14-623). In Kurns, the Court found field preemption based on Justice
Brandeis’s Napier opinion. Kurns, 132 S. Ct. at 1264 (citing Napier v. Atl. Coast Line R.R.
Comm’n., 272 U.S. 605 (1926)). However, in upholding the Fourth Circuit, the Supreme Court did
not rely on this sweeping form of field-preemption analysis, which would preclude any state
regulation at all of the issue. Instead, it recognized that the problem was Maryland’s disregard for
an interstate wholesale rate approved by FERC. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299. For further discussion,
see infra section IV(C)(1).
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objections raised by Justice Scalia, the decline of the bright-line approach
and rise of concurrent jurisdiction is not inconsistent with the text and history
of energy statutes, and case law construing energy statutes.
A.

Dual Sovereignty’s Crumbling Foundation

The Supreme Court’s 2002 decision in New York v. FERC, upholding
FERC’s landmark electric-power-market restructuring rules, provided the
first sign that dual sovereignty was destined to fall.177 “Since 1935, and
especially beginning in the 1970’s and 1980’s,” the Court observed, “the
number of electricity suppliers has increased dramatically.”178 Many of these
new entrants lacked access to transmission and thus faced anticompetitive
conditions in interstate energy markets.179 In response to dysfunctional
monopoly control of the industry and traditional rate regulation, in the 1990s
FERC proposed a landmark set of rules to restructure the electric power
industry (known collectively as Order No. 888), replacing cost-of-service
regulation of wholesale utility sales.180 FERC’s rules proposed to
“functionally unbundle[]” wholesale power sales from transmission and
provide “equal access” to transmission lines through the filing of open-access
tariffs with the agency.181
Although Congress had addressed evolving conditions in the electricpower industry on multiple occasions since 1935,182 FERC claimed it had
jurisdiction to adopt Order No. 888 under the original language of sections
205 and 206 of the FPA: “[T]he provisions concerning FERC’s power to
remedy unduly discriminatory practices . . . .”183 After making a finding that
utilities were discriminating in “bulk power markets,” in violation of section
205 of the FPA, FERC invoked its authority to address
“practice[s] . . . affecting” rates under section 206 to devise the remedy of
open access.184 Below, the D.C. Circuit had upheld FERC’s factual findings
of “a fundamental systemic problem in the industry.”185 FERC had
recognized that the FPA’s “jurisdictional lines change” when retail energy
products were broken into two different products, such as power supply and

177. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1 (2002).
178. Id. at 7.
179. Id. at 8–9, 9 n.6.
180. Id. at 10–11.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 11.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id. at 14 (quoting Transmission Access Policy Study Grp. v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 683
(D.C. Cir. 2000) (per curiam)). The Court also noted how FERC here was relying on a
“marketwide” remedy similar to what it had used in restructuring the natural gas industry. Id. (citing
Associated Gas Distrib. v. FERC, 824 F.2d 981 (D.C. Cir. 1987)).
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transmission.186 The Supreme Court agreed, adding that “the landscape of
the electric industry has changed since the enactment of the FPA, when the
electricity universe was ‘neatly divided into spheres of retail versus
wholesale sales.’”187
Of greater legal significance, the Court rejected the argument that Order
No. 888 exceeds FERC’s authority because it reaches too far into a sphere of
exclusive state authority.188 While FERC’s authority to unbundle wholesale
transmission and sales and require open-access transmission is not without
limit, the Court refused to apply a “presumption against pre-emption.”189
Rather, the Court reasoned, the key question under the statute “is to examine
the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency.”190
States challenging Order No. 888 quoted section 201(a)’s text, which
provides that federal regulation is “to extend only to those matters which are
not subject to regulation by the States.”191 However, as the Court’s
precedents address, section 201(a) is a mere “policy declaration” that “cannot
nullify a clear and specific grant of jurisdiction, even if the particular grant
seems inconsistent with the broadly expressed purpose.”192 This “prefatory”
language, the Court reasoned, “does not undermine FERC’s jurisdiction.”193
States also referenced section 201(b), which states that FERC has no
jurisdiction “over facilities used for the generation of electric energy or over
facilities used in local distribution or only for the transmission of electric
energy in intrastate commerce.”194 However, the Court reasoned that Order
No. 888 did nothing to “even arguably” affect state jurisdiction over these
things.195
The FPA not only authorizes FERC to “close the gap in state power
identified in Attleboro,” according to the Court, but also authorizes both “the
regulation of wholesale sales that had been previously subject to state
regulation” and the regulation of transmissions.196
While “there is no language in the statute limiting FERC’s transmission
jurisdiction to the wholesale market,” the Court observed that “the statute
does limit FERC’s sale jurisdiction to that at wholesale.”197 Still, the Court
186. Id. at 12.
187. Id. at 16 (quoting Transmission Access, 255 F.3d at 691).
188. Id. at 18–20.
189. Id. at 17–19.
190. Id. at 18 (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355, 374 (1986)).
191. Id. at 20 (quoting Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012))).
192. Id. at 22 (quoting FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964)).
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. at 847–48 (codified
as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012))).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 21.
197. Id. at 17.

ROSSI.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

430

12/2/2016 11:08 AM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 95:399

rejected the argument that the FPA fixed jurisdiction based on the
constitutional formalisms at the time of the statute’s enactment. Rather, after
this decision, the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction will depend on pragmatic
concerns surrounding the operation of energy markets reflected in the
agency’s factual and policy findings. The FPA “extended federal coverage
to some areas that previously had been state regulated,”198 but the Court also
noted “Attleboro does not define the outer limits of the statute’s coverage.”199
Referencing the “changes in the electricity industry that have occurred since
the FPA was enacted in 1935,” the Court concluded that there “is no evidence
that if Congress had foreseen the developments to which FERC has
responded, Congress would have objected” to FERC Order No. 888.200
B.

Recognition of Concurrent Jurisdiction

New York v. FERC reveals significant cracks in dual sovereignty’s
foundational facts,201 but decisions from the Supreme Court’s past two terms
reject dual sovereignty altogether as the organizing principle for addressing
jurisdictional conflicts under energy statutes. These decisions also recognize
statutory authorization in both the NGA and FPA for concurrent regulation
of many issues confronting modern energy markets, inviting federal and state
regulators to coordinate their efforts in innovative federalism approaches.
1. Justice Breyer’s ONEOK Opinion.—ONEOK v. Learjet, decided
during the 2014 term, held that state antitrust suits aimed at pipeline price
manipulation are not field preempted by the NGA.202 This case made its way

198. Id. at 7.
199. Id. at 21.
200. Id. at 23. Justice Thomas penned a dissent, which was joined by Justices Scalia and
Kennedy. Id. at 28 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The dissent agreed FERC
had jurisdiction under sections 205 and 206 of the FPA, id. at 28–29, but objected to other portions
of the majority opinion because, in the views of the dissenters, FERC did not go far enough in
regulating transmission. See id. at 42 (disagreeing with the Court’s deference “to FERC’s decision
not to regulate transmission connected to bundled retail sales” and instead favoring remand to FERC
to explain whether there was discrimination in the marketplace requiring FERC to provide a remedy
addressing “all transmission within its jurisdiction”).
201. Suzanna Sherry insightfully observes:
[T]he Supreme Court often structures and develops doctrine in ways that reflect its
unstated assumptions about these foundational facts, and changes in these hidden
factual assumptions may lead to unacknowledged changes in doctrine. We can use the
part we see—a sudden, unacknowledged, and apparently inexplicable change in
doctrine—to uncover the foundational assumptions hidden within the doctrine.
Sherry, supra note 7, at 184–85.
202. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1594 (2015). Justice Breyer’s majority
opinion was joined by a somewhat unusual line-up: Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Alito, Sotomayor,
and Kagan. Justice Thomas joined most of the majority opinion, especially its analysis of precedents
under the NGA. Id. at 1603 (Thomas, J., concurring). He wrote separately, however, to underscore
his longstanding view that implied preemption doctrine wanders from the Constitution. Id.; see also
Wyeth v. Levin, 555 U.S. 555, 582 (2009) (Thomas, J., concurring) (describing Justice Thomas’s
increasing skepticism about the Court’s implied preemption doctrine).
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to the Supreme Court following several state antitrust lawsuits brought by
retail buyers of natural gas, alleging that gas traders manipulated prices by
reporting false information to private price-index publishers and engaging in
wash trades.203 It presented a thorny legal question because the alleged
market manipulation affected both wholesale sales—the traditional purview
of federal regulators—and retail sales—which FERC is not authorized to
regulate.204
A core legal issue presented to the Supreme Court in ONEOK is
whether, in adopting the NGA, Congress intended to “occupy the field” of
antitrust remedies concerning pipelines’ pricing behavior in natural-gas
markets.205 The Ninth Circuit had found no preemption, construing the scope
of federal jurisdiction under the NGA narrowly and allowing the state law
antitrust claims to proceed.206 Pipelines seeking review of this decision
argued that the NGA preempts state antitrust-law challenges by retail
customers to practices that also affect wholesale gas rates regulated by
FERC.207
The Supreme Court agreed with the Ninth Circuit that the state law
antitrust claims are not preempted and should be allowed to proceed.208
Justice Breyer’s majority opinion emphasized that the NGA “was drawn with
meticulous regard for the continued exercise of state power, not to handicap
or dilute it in any way.”209 Under section 1(b) of the NGA, wholesale
transactions fall squarely within the jurisdiction of federal regulators.210 For
nearly seventy years, judicial precedents have reaffirmed the sharp clarity of
this federal–state division of authority over wholesale and retail sales,
sometimes even calling it a jurisdictional bright line.211 Yet the majority also
distinguished a number of previous cases finding field preemption under the
NGA, repeatedly emphasizing that Congress did not intend to dilute
altogether state regulatory power and that such a finding should only be made
“where detailed examination convinces us that a matter falls within the preempted field as defined by our precedents.”212 As the majority reasoned,
Congress has consistently favored competitive natural-gas markets, and
states also have a long history of providing “common-law and statutory
203. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1597–98 (2015) (majority opinion).
204. Id. at 1594.
205. Id. at 1595.
206. Id. at 1599.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 1594.
209. Id. at 1599 (quoting Panhandle E. Pipeline Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 332 U.S. 507, 517–
18 (1947)).
210. Id. at 1596; Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938) (codified as amended
at 15 U.S.C. § 717(b) (2012)).
211. Id. at 1607 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg,
476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986)).
212. Id. at 1599 (majority opinion).
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remedies against monopolies and unfair business practices” that reinforce
these markets.213
Indeed, in ONEOK, the majority questioned whether the NGA contains
a strict dividing line at all: “Petitioners and the dissent argue that there is, or
should be, a clear division between areas of state and federal authority in
natural-gas regulation. But that Platonic ideal does not describe the natural
gas regulatory world.”214 The majority emphasized too that, despite the
Solicitor General supporting the pipelines’ preemption arguments, FERC had
not made an agency determination that field preemption would bar the
antitrust claims.215 Accordingly no deference to the agency was due.216 In
upholding the Ninth Circuit, the majority left any questions regarding conflict
preemption of state antitrust regulation to be resolved by lower courts.217
ONEOK stops well clear of finding field preemption of state regulation,
contrasting with the result of Schneidewind.218 In rejecting the “forceful”
argument of the pipelines that exclusive federal jurisdiction should control,219
the majority reveals its reluctance to extend a preemptive effect to those
transactions that are not purely wholesale. Section 5(a) of the NGA
authorizes FERC to also address practices affecting wholesale rates, while
the statute also recognizes that retail sales are primarily in the purview of the
states.220 The difficult question this case presented was what to do when a
practice affects both types of sales. Justice Breyer’s majority opinion
provided a test for evaluating when state law will cross impermissibly into
the sphere of federal regulation: courts must consider “the target at which the
state law aims in determining whether [the] law is pre-empted.”221 With the
particular antitrust claims at issue in this case, however, the state regulation
was primarily aimed at practices “affecting” retail rates, so the majority
reasoned that it was “firmly on the States’ side of that dividing line.”222
ONEOK is significant for broader debates surrounding energy
federalism. It rejects dual sovereignty as the organizing principle for
addressing jurisdictional issues under the NGA. In some ways the majority’s
test for preemption—which focuses on the federal regulatory target at which
state law is aiming—takes inspiration from and is entirely consistent with

213. Id. at 1601 (quoting California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989)).
214. Id. at 1601 (citations omitted).
215. Id. at 1602.
216. Id. at 1602–03.
217. Id. at 1595, 1603.
218. See supra subpart II(B).
219. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599.
220. Id.; Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 5(a), 52 Stat. 821, 823 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 717d (2012)).
221. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599.
222. Id. at 1600 (quoting Nw. Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm’n 489 U.S. 493, 514
(1989)).
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Schneidewind’s attention to specific facts surrounding the tension between
federal and state regulation.223 Yet, unlike the Court’s previous energy
preemption precedents, ONEOK does not ground this analysis in a field
preemption framework. Rather, by calling into question whether field
preemption doctrine is necessary or desirable in approaching preemption
under the NGA, the majority’s decision endorses concurrent state regulation
of anticompetitive conduct in interstate gas markets.
2. Justice Kagan’s EPSA Opinion.—While ONEOK strongly endorsed
state antitrust regulation of energy markets, the Supreme Court’s decision last
term in EPSA embraced expansive federal authority over wholesale energy
markets. This pathbreaking decision upheld FERC’s rules for demand
response compensation in wholesale energy markets.224 Instead of grounding
its analysis in the field preemption framework of previous precedents, EPSA
squarely rejected the dual sovereignty approach, which the D.C. Circuit had
applied below to hold FERC’s demand response rules ultra vires under the
FPA.225 “We will not read the FPA, against its clear terms,” the majority
reasoned, “to halt a practice that so evidently enables the Commission to
fulfill its statutory duties of holding down prices and enhancing reliability in
the wholesale energy market.”226
Without doubt, EPSA will prove important for modern energy
markets.227 It definitively emboldens federal authorities to regulate a broad
range of issues confronting energy markets. These include initiatives to
promote clean energy, as the environmental community celebrated

223. See supra subpart II(B).
224. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 784 (2016). This 6–2 lineup
was also somewhat unusual. Id. at 765. Justice Kagan wrote the majority opinion, which was joined
by Chief Justice Roberts, along with Justices Kennedy, Breyer, Ginsburg, and Sotomayor. Id. As
discussed below, Justice Scalia wrote a dissent, which was joined by Justice Thomas. Id. at 784.
Justice Alito did not participate in review of the case or the decision. Id.
225. See supra subpart II(C).
226. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 782. The Court upheld FERC’s demand regulations against an
arbitrary and capricious attack, reversing the second ground for the D.C. Circuit’s opinion on this
ground as well. Id. at 784.
227. A number of published articles already contain careful analysis of the decision’s
implications. See, e.g., Matthew R. Christiansen, FERC v. EPSA: Functionalism and the Electricity
Industry of the Future, 68 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 100, 100, 102 (2016) (speculating that EPSA “may
ultimately rank among the most significant energy law cases of all time” and that it may “provide a
solid foundation for similarly functionalist and pragmatic approaches to adapting electricity
regulation to the changing electricity sector”); Eisen, supra note 60, at 1787–88 (emphasizing how
EPSA clarifies the expansive nature of FERC’s authority over practices affecting wholesale rates);
González, supra note 21, at 1429 (observing that the Court endorsed a functionalist approach in
EPSA). For a discussion of the Court’s decision and its implications for state clean-energy policies,
grid-edge innovation, and agency deference, see Symposium, FERC v. EPSA Symposium, 40
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 1 (2016).
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immediately after this decision was issued.228 However, EPSA is also
significant because it resoundingly rejects dual sovereignty as the primary
framework for addressing important jurisdictional issues in modern energy
markets. Rather than beginning its jurisdictional analysis with the traditional
bright-line approach, the majority focused on the pragmatic challenges FERC
faces given its policies to restructure the electric-power industry by
enhancing competition and its ongoing statutory obligation to ensure “just
and reasonable” rates.229 The decision emphasized, in particular, the serious
problem presented by electricity’s inability to be stored and the need to
coordinate the supply and demand of energy on the grid in real time.230 It
also noted “the wholesale electric market lacks the self-correcting
mechanism of other markets.”231 The majority recognized that the “statutory
division” between wholesale and retail sales “generates a steady flow of
jurisdictional disputes because—in point of fact if not of law—the wholesale
and retail markets in electricity are inextricably linked.”232
Apart from its heavy reliance on changing foundational facts that
support the agency’s claim to jurisdiction, three analytical aspects of EPSA’s
reasoning stand out as especially important for future energy federalism
disputes. First, the Supreme Court placed its initial (and primary) analytical
focus on establishing whether FERC has jurisdiction, using the established
test that a practice must “directly affect” wholesale markets.233 Second,
EPSA clarified that the FPA does not authorize direct federal regulation of
retail rates, but this is not a realm of authority that is exclusively reserved for
states.234
Third, the majority recognized the importance of state

228. See, e.g., Darius Dixon, Supreme Court Backs Federal Authority in Power Saving Rule,
POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2016), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/01/supreme-court-backs-electricitysaving-rule-218182 [https://perma.cc/643Y-HTUD] (quoting Environmental Defense Fund
President Fred Krup, who said, “[t]oday’s Supreme Court decision is a victory for all Americans
who want greater choice and value broader customer access to clean, low-cost energy” and Allison
Clements of the Natural Resources Defense Council, who said the decision is key “because demand
response is flexible and fast-acting, it enables the affordable integration of more wind and solar
power into the electricity transmission grid”).
229. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 767–68. FERC initiated these policies in Order 888, as the Court
addressed in New York v. FERC. See supra subpart III(A). EPSA notes that FERC’s primary
strategy for ensuring just and reasonable rates has been “to break down regulatory and economic
barriers that hinder a free market in wholesale electricity.” EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 768 (quoting Morgan
Stanley Capital Grp., Inc. v. Pub. Util. Dist. No. 1, 554 U.S. 527, 536 (2008)).
230. Id. at 768.
231. Id. at 769.
232. Id. at 766.
233. Id. at 773.
234. See id. at 777–79 (conceding that FERC may not “set” retail rates but that it may impose
regulations that change consumer incentives).
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experimentation in approaching retail customer demand response.235 I
address each of these in turn.
After describing the practical problem FERC confronts in regulating
interstate energy markets, the Supreme Court began its jurisdictional analysis
in a fundamentally different manner than the D.C. Circuit. It did not fixate
on a static sphere of sovereignty reserved to the states; instead it first assessed
whether the FPA authorizes FERC to regulate demand response in interstate
markets even though it is not a wholesale energy sale.236 Although the
majority
recognized
that
FERC’s
reliance
on
remedial
“practices . . . affecting” jurisdiction potentially might “extend FERC’s
power to some surprising places,” it also endorsed a common sense judicial
test that limits FERC’s jurisdiction to rules or practices that “directly affect
the [wholesale] rate.”237 Highlighting FERC’s findings and policy rationales
regarding how demand response can bring down wholesale energy prices,
EPSA reasoned that FERC’s rules regulating wholesale demand response
meet this standard “with room to spare.”238
EPSA also sheds light on the limited extent to which provisions of the
FPA reserve exclusive state powers. Section 201(a), which states that federal
regulation of electricity “extend[s] only to those matters which are not subject
to regulation by the States,” does not, in the view of the majority, provide
state regulation any legal protection from federal intrusion.239 Rather,
consistent with past cases, EPSA treats section 201(a) as “merely a ‘policy
declaration . . . of great generality’” that only points towards the state
authority reserved by section 201(b) over retail sales and specific facilities.240
The Supreme Court also reasoned that “a FERC regulation does not run
afoul” of section 201(b)’s prohibition “just because it affects—even
substantially—the quantity or terms of retail sales.”241 Again appealing to
pragmatism, the majority emphasized how “transactions that occur on the
wholesale market have natural consequences at the retail level.”242
Methodologically, EPSA’s approach suggests that the assessment of
federalism disputes must begin with an analysis of FERC’s authority: “When
235. See id. at 779–80 (concluding that FERC’s provision of a state veto over “effective”
increases in retail rates produced by federal demand response programs constitutes a “program of
cooperative federalism”).
236. See id. at 772–73 (describing the D.C. Circuit’s bright-line approach in the case below and
outlining the steps in the Supreme Court’s analysis).
237. Id. at 774 (quoting Cal. Indep. Sys. Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 403 (D.C. Cir.
2004)).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 775 n.6; Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(a), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935)
(codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(a) (2012)).
240. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 775 n.6 (quoting FPC v. S. Cal. Edison Co., 376 U.S. 205, 215 (1964)
(quoting Conn. Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 527 (1945))).
241. Id. at 776.
242. Id.

ROSSI.TOPRINTER (DO NOT DELETE)

436

12/2/2016 11:08 AM

Texas Law Review

[Vol. 95:399

FERC regulates what takes place on the wholesale market, as part of carrying
out its charge to improve how that market runs, then no matter the effect on
retail rates [section 201(b) of the FPA] imposes no bar.”243 After deciding
that FERC has remedial authority under the statute to issue the demand
response rules, the majority seems to presumptively favor FERC exercising
its jurisdiction, including concurrently.
This does not, however, mean that FERC can regulate without any
limits. Section 201(b)’s language states that the provisions of the FPA do not
apply to “any other sale of electric energy” (other than wholesale sales).244
Contrary to the view of the D.C. Circuit below, this does not create exclusive
state jurisdiction. Instead, this provision only recognizes that the FPA (in its
plain terms) does not authorize FERC to regulate “any other sale.” For
example, this would seem to suggest that FERC cannot directly regulate retail
sales or set retail rates.245 But, in regulating wholesale markets there is
nothing in the FPA that precludes FERC’s regulation of wholesale markets
from having an effect on retail rates or on the quantity or terms of retail
sales.246 It follows that the only reservation of exclusive authority for state
regulators appears in the last sentence of section 201(b), which does not
speak in terms of what FERC is authorized to do but instead states FERC
“shall not have jurisdiction.”247 States, of course, still set retail rates (since
FERC is simply not authorized to do this) and nothing about FERC’s demand
response regulations directly regulates generation or distribution facilities,
which are simply outside FERC’s jurisdiction under the FPA.248
Finally, EPSA clearly indicates that the FPA’s allocation of federal–state
authority allows for concurrent federal and state authority over the practices
affecting rates and encourages state experimentation. FERC’s regulation of
demand response occurs against the backdrop of considerable variation in
state-policy approaches regarding retail demand response and retail customer
participation in the wholesale market.249 FERC’s demand response rule, the
Court noted, “allows any State regulator to prohibit its consumers from
making demand response bids in the wholesale market.”250 While FERC
would appear to have the statutory power to negate these kinds of state policy

243. Id.
244. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847 (1935) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)).
245. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 777–78.
246. Id. at 776.
247. Federal Power Act § 201(b) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)).
248. Id.
249. For a discussion of the various state schemes to facilitate demand response, see Stuart
Schare & Brett Feldman, A New Era of Demand Response, POWER ENGINEERING (Aug. 21, 2015),
http://www.power-eng.com/articles/print/volume-119/issue-8/features/a-new-era-of-demandresponse.html [https://perma.cc/8EUY-7FD4].
250. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779.
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decisions if they produced discrimination in interstate power markets,251 it
chose not to exercise this authority.252 In effect, FERC allowed states an “opt
out,” since any FERC regulation of demand response depends on the
voluntary acquiescence of states. According to the Supreme Court, “that veto
gives States the means to block whatever ‘effective’ increases in retail rates
demand response programs might be thought to produce.”253 This allows
states to experiment with a wide range of approaches to promote energy
conservation, including allowing the states the option of prohibiting retail
customers from making demand response bids into wholesale markets.
This state experimentation may reinforce federal goals regarding
wholesale power markets, but ultimately the participation in wholesale
markets depends on the choices of customers and private firms. In rejecting
the D.C. Circuit’s novel claim that FERC’s demand response rule is ultra
vires because it serves to “lure” retail customers into the wholesale market,
at the very minimum EPSA endorses the basic principle (which FERC has
applied elsewhere) that it is the customer’s choice to participate in wholesale
energy markets that triggers FERC’s jurisdiction.254 Since demand response
is a market-driven innovation, not something FERC created, its effects on the
wholesale market and FERC’s reasons for regulating it will ultimately hinge
on customer practices and choices.255
C.

Unsnarling Concurrent Jurisdiction’s Roots

Justice Scalia’s ONEOK dissent critiques the majority for making a
“snarl” out of the statute and judicial precedents.256 According to him, the
Supreme Court’s longstanding precedents “draw a firm line between national
and local authority,” while the majority “smudges this line.”257 In contrast to
concurrent jurisdiction, Justice Scalia believed that the FPA contains a
“bright line easily ascertained” that makes unnecessary a case-by-case
assessment of facts related to jurisdiction.258 He saw the ONEOK majority’s
“make-it-up-as-you-go-along” approach to preemption259 as unduly fixating
on the purposes or aims (or why) rather than what the state regulates.260
Justice Scalia also found the prospect of multiple antitrust standards in

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
(1986)).
259.
260.

See infra subpart IV(B).
EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779.
Id. at 779–80.
Id. at 778–79.
Id.
ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1606 (2015) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1603.
Id. at 1607 (quoting Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966
Id. at 1603.
Id. at 1606.
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natural-gas markets “unworkable.”261 “From now on,” he stated, “pipelines
will have to ensure that their behavior conforms to the discordant regulations
of fifty States—or more accurately, to the discordant verdicts of untold state
antitrust juries.”262
His dissent in EPSA—the last dissent he authored—shows perhaps less
vigor but no less conviction. Justice Scalia would have upheld the D.C.
Circuit decision finding FERC’s demand response rules ultra vires under the
FPA.263 The EPSA majority and dissent diverge not only in their conclusions
but also in their basic approaches to interpreting the statute: Justice Scalia
would begin by examining whether the statute forecloses federal regulation
by reserving state authority, while (at least in his view) the majority flips the
presumption under the statute to favor FERC, rather than states.264 According
to Justice Scalia, whether the statute leaves a regulatory gap “depends on
what it says and not on what its proponents hoped to achieve.”265 He also
raises a concern that the majority’s emphasis on the statutory objective of
closing regulatory gaps results in an “extravagant and otherwise-unheard-of
method for establishing regulatory jurisdiction.”266
It is no surprise to see Justice Scalia dissent from these recent decisions,
given his partiality for bright-line rules.267 But despite Justice Scalia’s
hyperbole, the dual sovereignty approach to jurisdiction is not required by
the language or the structure of energy statutes, and an alternative approach
need not produce a statutory “snarl.”

261. Id. at 1603.
262. Id. at 1608. It may be somewhat surprising to see Justice Scalia supporting more federal
regulatory power here—especially given his strident dissent in Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct.
2492 (2012) (striking down portions of Arizona’s immigration law on preemption grounds); see id.
at 2511 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (objecting to the majority’s opinion on
the grounds that it “deprives States of what most would consider the defining characteristic of
sovereignty”). He, however, also seems squarely committed to uniform national regulation of
competitive markets under federal statutes. Justice Scalia’s concerns about nonuniform regulation
of gas markets echo Justice Alito’s dissent, with which Justice Scalia joined, in Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555, 604 (2009) (Alito, J., dissenting).
263. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 789 (2016) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
264. See id. at 785 (“While the majority would find every sale of electric energy to be within
FERC’s authority to regulate unless the transaction is demonstrably a retail sale, the statute actually
excludes from FERC’s jurisdiction all sales of electric energy except those that are demonstrably
sales at wholesale.”).
265. Id. at 788.
266. Id.
267. See Gluck, supra note 20, at 2042–43 (“Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and even Chief
Justice Roberts have been more willing to see the federalism inside federal statutes than have more
textualist Justices like Justice Scalia, even though textualist judges have often been more federalist.
Justice Scalia wants clear direction and bright lines—a desire incompatible with a Congress that
legislates with gaps for administrative flexibility and that utilizes states in varied ways across
different statutes.” (footnote omitted)).
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It is helpful to begin—as would Justice Scalia—with the text of the
NGA and the FPA. While these statutes speak to comprehensive federal
authority and provide powerful tools to federal regulators, these provisions
state only that federal law “shall apply to” certain transactions.268 They do
not use terms like “exclusive” or “preemptive” to describe federal regulatory
jurisdiction. Thus, if federal law preempts state regulations it is because of
some form of implied preemption—such as the approach of Napier269—not
because of the explicit text of the NGA and the FPA. The structure of the
statute, moreover, hardly incorporates a robust conception of state
sovereignty. The otherwise-expansive authority granted by the NGA and the
FPA is subject to an external constraint: state regulators have very-limitedbut-exclusive authority over specific energy facilities.270 EPSA’s discussion
of section 201 of the FPA illustrates this point: “The above conclusion [that
FERC’s rules governing wholesale demand response directly affect
wholesale rates] does not end our inquiry into the Commission’s statutory
authority; to uphold the Rule, we also must determine that it does not regulate
retail electricity sales.”271 There is thus nothing in either the text or structure
of the FPA that requires dual sovereignty’s bright-line approach to
jurisdiction.
Perhaps the strongest rationale supported by history for recognizing a
sharp jurisdictional division of power in these energy statutes is that this
formalistic view of the Commerce Clause produced Attleboro and its gap,272
and that this constitutional doctrine was thus an assumption against which
Congress was legislating in the 1930s. This argument that New Deal-era
energy statutes locked in an antiquated constitutional-federalism principle by
simple virtue of adoption (with no other mention in the statute), however,
was rejected in New York v. FERC.273 It is also inconsistent with the Court’s

268. Natural Gas Act, ch. 556, § 1(b), 52 Stat. 821, 821 (1938) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 717(b) (2012)) (“The provisions of this Act shall apply to the transportation of natural gas
in interstate commerce . . . .”); Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. 838, 847
(1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1) (2012)) (“The provisions of this Part shall
apply to the transmission of electric energy in interstate commerce and the sale of energy at
wholesale in interstate commerce . . . .”).
269. See supra subpart II(A).
270. Natural Gas Act § 1(b), 52 Stat. at 821 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 717(b)) (“The
provisions of this Act . . . shall not apply to . . . the local distribution of natural gas or to the facilities
used for such distribution or to the production or gathering of natural gas.”); Federal Power Act, ch.
687, sec. 213, § 201(b), 49 Stat. at 848 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824(b)(1)) (“[FERC]
shall not have jurisdiction, except as specifically provided . . . over facilities used for the generation
of electric energy or over facilities used in local distribution or only the transmission of electric
energy in intrastate commerce, or over facilities for the transmission of electric energy consumed
wholly by the transmitter.”).
271. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 775.
272. See supra subpart I(A) (discussing Attleboro); see generally Post, supra note 4 (noting
how 1920s Commerce Clause jurisprudence was premised on dual sovereignty).
273. See supra subpart III(A).
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recent turn towards giving little weight to the “contemporary legal context”
against which Congress legislated when interpreting statutes.274 It also would
produce absurd results if used as a general interpretative principle in
approaching energy statutes. For example, such an approach would also
require modern courts to use the Lochner275-era cases such as Smyth v.
Ames276 in addressing the rate-setting authority of agencies under
communications and energy statutes adopted during the New Deal era, rather
than the later, more deferential approach that courts have consistently favored
for more than half a century.277 Absent some language to the contrary,
statutes simply do not freeze in place existing constitutional doctrines as
interpretive tools.
Nor is it “unheard” of to suggest that New Deal-era statutes authorize
some concurrent jurisdiction in the regulation of energy markets. These
statutes clearly envision state regulation continuing against the backdrop of
comprehensive (but not exclusive) federal authority. In the legislative history
surrounding adoption of these statutes, Congress envisioned overlapping
jurisdiction. A number of the Court’s precedents also give the lie to dual
sovereignty’s nirvana-like fallacy that energy markets ever adhered to a static
jurisdictional bright line based on legal formalisms. In terms of the statutes
and case law, the majorities in ONEOK and EPSA are thus correct in
beginning with an assessment of FERC’s jurisdiction. The conclusions that
these statutes also authorize concurrent jurisdiction over a considerable range
of activities, rather than require dual sovereignty, is not without historical
basis.278
The history surrounding the FPA’s enactment contains numerous
statements showing that its supporting legislators understood the expansion
274. This interpretative principle is most clearly illustrated by the Court’s implied-right-ofaction cases. In Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), the Court held that private individuals
may not sue to enforce disparate impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964. Id. at 278. When asked to interpret Title VI according to the interpretive principle
prevalent at the time of the statute’s enactment, the Court declined. Id. at 287–88. Justice Scalia,
writing for the Court, distinguished several prior implied-right-of-action cases, concluding that the
Court had “never accorded dispositive weight to context shorn of text. In determining whether
statutes create private rights of action, as in interpreting statutes generally, legal context matters
only to the extent it clarifies text.” Id. at 288 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
275. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
276. 169 U.S. 466, 545–49 (1898) (adopting reproduction cost as a constitutionally required
approach to setting rates in order to protect railroad and utility investors). The Supreme Court
overruled this approach in the 1940s. See FPC v. Hope Nat. Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 627 (1944);
FPC v. Nat. Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 602 (1942) (Black, Douglas, Murphy, JJ., concurring).
277. For discussion of this since-repudiated approach to constitutional protection of property in
utility regulation, see generally Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from
the Controversy Over Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187 (1984).
278. Of course, a statute may affirmatively identify specific activities as outside of FERC’s
reach, but, as the Court makes clear in EPSA, the only activities reserved exclusively for states under
the FPA are the facilities listed in the last sentence of § 201(b). See supra note 244 and
accompanying text.
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of federal authority as an overlay onto existing state regulatory power, not as
replacing it. The Report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce
that accompanied the bill that would become the FPA states that
“[s]ubsection (a) . . . declares the policy of Congress to extend that regulation
to those matters which cannot be regulated by the States and to assist the
States in the exercise of their regulatory powers.”279 The House Committee
Report accompanying that same piece of legislation states: “The bill . . .
contains provisions authorizing the Federal Commission to aid the State
commissions in their efforts to ascertain and fix reasonable charges.”280 That
Report also notes that: “The new parts are so drawn as to be a complement
to and in no sense a usurpation of State regulatory authority . . . .”281
In addition, earlier in consideration of the proposed legislation, thenFPC Commissioner Clyde Seavey testified in support of creating federal
jurisdiction over interstate power markets before the House Committee on
Interstate and Foreign Commerce.282 He stated that the proposed legislation
“is designed to secure coordination on a regional scale of the Nation’s power
resources and to fill the gap in the present State regulation of electric
utilities.”283 And he further elaborated, “[i]t is conceived entirely as a
supplement to, and not a substitute for State regulation.”284
This legislative history clearly envisions a continuing role for state
regulation, and some of the Court’s earliest decisions also call into question
whether dual sovereignty is required by the statute. One of the earliest
preemption cases under the NGA noted that the jurisdictional inquiry
has been less concerned to find a point in time and space where the
interstate commerce in gas ends and intrastate commerce begins, and
has looked to the nature of the state regulation involved, the objective
of the state, and the effect of the regulation upon the national interest
in the commerce.285
In the first decade following the enactment of the FPA, the Court also
observed that under the statute “[f]ederal jurisdiction was to follow the flow
of electric energy, an engineering and scientific, rather than a legalistic or
governmental, test.”286
Despite the shadow that dual sovereignty cast over such interpretations,
courts also have a long tradition of construing the scope of FERC’s authority

279. S. REP. NO. 74-621, at 48 (1935).
280. H.R. REP. NO. 74-1318, at 8 (1935).
281. Id.
282. House Hearings, supra note 47, at 384, 392 (statement of FPC Commissioner Clyde
Seavey in support of original bill).
283. Id. at 384.
284. Id.
285. Ill. Nat. Gas Co. v. Cent. Ill. Pub. Serv. Co., 314 U.S. 498, 505 (1942).
286. Conn. Light & Power Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 515, 529 (1945).
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under these statutes to prioritize the purpose of allowing federal law to fill
regulatory gaps presented by energy markets.287 As the Court stated in 1961:
[W]hen a dispute arises over whether a given transaction is within the
scope of federal or state regulatory authority, we are not inclined to
approach the problem negatively, thus raising the possibility that a “no
man’s land” will be created. That is to say, in a borderline case where
congressional authority is not explicit we must ask whether state
authority can practicably regulate a given area and, if we find that it
cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority
governs.288
Justice Stevens’s 2002 opinion for the Court in New York v. FERC
suggests that, methodologically, this analysis must begin with an assessment
of “the nature and scope of the authority granted by Congress to the agency,”
rather than with a fixed sphere of state sovereignty.289
Finally, though there is little doubt that federal authority over interstate
energy markets is comprehensive, the idea that it is exclusive is a judicial
construction, not anything that is required by the statute itself. A long line of
cases rejects the idea of exclusive federal jurisdiction over wholesale markets
or exclusive state jurisdiction even where federal regulation has a substantial
effect on retail rates or retail energy sales. For example, the Court has stated
that “once a company is properly found to be a ‘public utility’ under the Act
the fact that a local commission may also have regulatory power does not
preclude exercise of the Commission’s functions.”290 Later decisions
observe that the established authority of a state to regulate retail rates does
not foreclose federal regulators from taking into account the same rates, even
when federal regulation will ultimately affect retail rates. As the Supreme
Court states in FPC v. Conway Corp.,291 even though a federal regulator
“lacks authority to fix rates for direct industrial sales, [it] may take those rates
into consideration when it fixes the rates for interstate wholesale sales which
are subject to its jurisdiction.”292
Even Schneidewind, which embraces a bright line and dual sovereignty
approach, acknowledged that any analytical approach to preemption that only
examines the scope of federal jurisdiction will not, on its own terms, support

287. As discussed above, this also has a strong grounding in the history surrounding the
enactment of these statutes. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
288. FPC v. Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1961) (citation omitted).
289. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 18 (2002) (quoting La. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. FCC, 476
U.S. 355, 374 (1986)).
290. Conn. Power & Light Co., 324 U.S. at 533.
291. 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
292. Id. at 281–82 (quoting Panhandle E. Pipe Line Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 635, 646 (1945)).
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a conclusion that a state law is preempted.293 In applying field preemption, a
court still needs to decide the scope of the field and apply this to state law.
Courts thus cannot resolve a preemption question under the vacuum of
federal law and its static definition of a sphere of federal authority without
examining facts related to purposes. For example, Schneidewind’s field
preemption analysis was not based on Congress’s delegation to FERC but
looked to the purposes of the state law as well as the nature of federal law in
deciding whether a state regulatory action is within the scope of the field.294
By its very nature, this kind of preemption analysis does not reason to its
conclusion based on a predefined sphere of federal regulation, as the
delegation analysis of Napier would suggest.295 Instead, this kind of
preemption analysis requires analysis of how federal and state regulation of
energy markets interact when they overlap. Thus, even before ONEOK and
EPSA, the Supreme Court appears to have recognized that state regulatory
programs have the potential to serve as complements, rather than inherent
impediments, to federal regulation of energy markets.
IV. New Challenges for Energy Federalism(s)
It is easy to get lost in the weeds of energy federalism, especially to the
extent courts have traditionally fixated on a formalistic bright-line approach
or tried to define exclusive jurisdiction for various activities. In the end,
however, as the Supreme Court recognized in its 2016 EPSA opinion, these
jurisdictional disputes always circle back to one overarching principle: no
one, not even those who advocate for field preemption, disputes that the
primary purposes behind New Deal-era energy statutes is to close general
regulatory gaps.296
The traditional bright-line approach is based on the premise that these
statutes prohibit federal–state jurisdictional overlaps. However, as I have
argued, outside of a few very specific statutory provisions that speak clearly
to foreclose federal regulation of particular facilities or transactions, there is
nothing in the legislative history, text, structure, or purpose of these statutes
that requires a dual sovereignty approach. Applying a presumption in favor
of these statutes authorizing concurrent federal–state jurisdiction over energy
markets not only recognizes extensive federal authority over interstate energy
markets. It also leaves states considerable authority to craft their own energyresource policies by fundamentally redefining energy-federalism disputes as
political and policy questions, not as formalistic legal ones.

293. See Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293, 300–01 (1988) (confirming
Congress’s power to implicitly indicate an “intent to occupy a given field to the exclusion of state
law” in the absence of explicit statutory language).
294. See supra notes 114–18 and accompanying text.
295. See supra notes 77–81 and accompanying text.
296. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016).
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But concurrent jurisdiction is hardly neat and tidy. The Supreme
Court’s recognition of concurrent jurisdiction leaves many questions
unanswered and is certain to motivate new jurisdictional challenges
regarding the scope of both federal and state regulatory authority.297 In
contrast to dual sovereignty, concurrent jurisdiction requires regulators and
courts to be more attentive to the core purposes behind energy statutes as they
address modern market disputes—a fundamental insight that could help to
bring a principled resolution to some current issues pending before courts
involving state incentives for power-generation capacity. EPSA highlights
the value of state experimentation, yet it also recognizes that it is ultimately
FERC that possesses a powerful range of federalism possibilities to aid its
regulatory approach for modern power markets. But how far can these state
initiatives go, and when will they be preempted?
The Supreme Court has recently provided part of the answer in Hughes,
which concluded that Maryland’s incentives to encourage new natural-gas
plants interfered with FERC’s regulation of the wholesale market under the
FPA.298 Hughes favors a preemption conclusion for certain state initiatives
that conflict with federally approved wholesale-market energy prices, but its
holding is narrow. As I argue below, the decision does not reject concurrent
jurisdiction in the regulation of wholesale energy markets and envisions
continued leeway for state energy resource subsidies and incentives—
especially for energy-supply attributes that FERC-approved rates do not price
in the wholesale market. However, if courts do not approach these issues
carefully, they risk converting Hughes’s into a sweeping application of field
preemption, which would be inconsistent with a concurrent jurisdiction in
energy federalism. This would be a mistake. In order for regulatory
federalism to evolve and to adapt to modern energy markets, it will be
necessary for courts to carefully approach some of the precedents and
remaining doctrinal relics of dual sovereignty, especially after Hughes.
They can start by eliminating use of judicial field preemption with
regards to “practices. . .affecting” rates language in energy statutes. Courts
should instead review FERC’s actual regulatory decisions, including agency
determinations of jurisdictional facts and policy rationales, and employ
conflict-preemption principles while doing so. In addition, while concurrent
jurisdiction still contains some meaningful limits on federal authority under
energy statutes, these are primarily grounded in pragmatic agency law and
policy findings, not some predefined notion of state sovereignty or judicial
precedents that fix the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction.

297. See Joel B. Eisen, FERC v. EPSA and the Path to a Cleaner Electricity Sector, 40 HARV.
ENVTL. L. REV. F. 1, 9 (2016) (arguing the decision in EPSA left many questions unanswered
including the extent to which states can regulate electricity if their laws impact wholesale markets).
298. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1291–92 (2016).
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As I also discuss below, clarification of FERC’s role in making
preemption determinations can help to enhance the transparency and
accountability, while also allowing regulators to better adapt their approaches
to evolving new issues in energy markets. Judicial clarification of these
issues can help to encourage more creative federal–state collaborations, leave
considerable space for state experimentation, and simplify and make more
predictable preemption analyses.
A.

Avoiding a Regulatory “No Man’s Land”

The Supreme Court’s 2016 EPSA decision illustrates how a federalism
approach premised on concurrent jurisdiction—rather than bright-line
jurisdiction—can often better advance the primary purpose of energy statutes
in modern energy markets. Apart from the very clauses in these statutes,
there is no evidence that it also was aiming to give similar weight to avoiding
all federal–state jurisdictional overlaps. And there is no evidence whatsoever
that Congress intended to endorse a single federalism principle—dual
sovereignty or otherwise—to govern regulation of energy markets.
Rather, the core objectives of the FPA and NGA are to close regulatory
gaps. There is little doubt that in adopting these statutes Congress was aiming
to address the Attleboro gap.299 This gap is not permanently fixed by law.
Instead, it is the byproduct of energy-market conditions coupled with federal
and state regulatory efforts. If states are unable to “practicably” regulate a
certain area, it is appropriate to ask whether the statute gives FERC some
substantive or remedial authority to address the conduct.300 Where state
regulation results in a regulatory “no man’s land,” the Supreme Court has
recognized how federal regulation under the statute is appropriate.301
Consistent with this historical expansion of federal authority, the
Court’s 2016 EPSA decision upheld FERC’s authorization to adopt demand
response rules for wholesale energy markets. It is thus well established that
the FPA allows broad federal jurisdiction over not only wholesale sales, but
also “practices . . . affecting” sales—as a way of ensuring that there is no
regulatory gap in power markets.302 In recognizing how demand response
can “directly affect” wholesale markets, EPSA concluded that demand
response is within the agency’s clear statutory authorization “with room to

299. See supra subpart I(A).
300. See FPC v. Transcon. Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 19–20 (1961) (“[W]here congressional
authority is not explicit we must ask whether state authority can practicably regulate a given area
and, if we find that it cannot, then we are impelled to decide that federal authority governs.”).
301. Id.
302. See Eisen, supra note 60, at 1845 (“If FERC could not oversee mechanisms that form the
core of the wholesale markets, it would create the kind of regulatory gap that Congress sought to
correct when it adopted the FPA in 1935.”).
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spare.”303 It reasons that following the D.C. Circuit’s approach of excluding
demand response from FERC’s jurisdiction would “prevent[] all use of a tool
that no one . . . disputes will curb prices and enhance reliability in the
wholesale electricity market.”304
After finding FERC’s demand response rules to be clearly authorized
and not prohibited under the statute, the Court addressed how the effect of
the D.C. Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the scope of FERC’s jurisdiction
would be to create a situation where no regulator—federal or state—would
be able to address activities regarding demand response in wholesale power
markets. Under the D.C. Circuit approach “state commissions could not
regulate demand response bids either.”305 But as the Court observed, this
produces a problem: “If neither FERC nor the States can regulate wholesale
demand response, then by definition no one can. But under the Act, no
electricity transaction can proceed unless it is regulable by someone. . . .
Congress passed the FPA precisely to eliminate vacuums of authority over
the electricity markets.”306
In preventing the creation of “any” regulatory “no man’s land,” the
Court further emphasized, “[t]he Act makes federal and state powers
‘complementary’ and ‘comprehensive,’ so that ‘there [will] be no “gaps” for
private interests to subvert the public welfare.”307 This same concern led
Justice Kagan to press the lawyers for the appellee during oral argument. As
she stated then, if the D.C. Circuit opinion were upheld, “there would be a
regulatory gap.”308 She elaborated, “[i]n other words, FERC can’t do
anything nor can the States do anything.”309
EPSA, however, should not be understood as only endorsing expansive
federal authority to address regulatory gaps. It is a mistake to think that any
time FERC is authorized by statute to regulate an activity that this preempts
any state regulation. Even the Court’s decision in Hughes, which upheld
federal preemption of Maryland’s incentives for new power-generation
facilities given FERC’s approval of the PJM-capacity market,310 shows how
an overly broad preemption analysis can produce the reverse effect.
Categorically claiming broad comprehensive federal regulation, as with field
preemption, may also in some instances produce a situation where both

303. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760 (2016). As the Court notes,
its determination is based on the clear language of the statute, not on any sort of deference to the
agency. Id. at 773 n.5.
304. Id. at 773.
305. Id. at 780.
306. Id.
307. Id. at 780 (quoting FPC v. La. Power & Light Co., 406 U.S. 621, 631 (1972)).
308. Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct.
760 (2016) (No. 14-840).
309. Id.
310. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1291–92 (2016).
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federal and state regulators are incapable of addressing conduct in modern
energy markets.
In writing for the majority in Hughes, Justice Ginsburg concluded:
“We . . . need not and do not address the permissibility of various other
measures States might employ to encourage development of new or clean
generation, including tax incentives, land grants, direct subsidies,
construction of state-owned generation facilities, or re-regulation of the
energy sector.”311 In other words, the Court left open the question of whether
in a future case many other state incentives for clean-energy generation will
be preempted by federal regulation under the FPA. A broad finding of federal
preemption as preempting all state-generation incentives and subsidies would
produce a “no man’s land” for many incentives affecting new, clean sources
of energy. To prevent creating this kind of regulatory void, courts should
avoid excessively broad claims of exclusive jurisdiction based merely on
whether a statute authorizes federal regulation without also addressing
whether regulators have made a practicable commitment to exercising this
authority to address energy-market activities.312
Of course, field preemption under energy statutes has a long history in
the context of utility-rate approvals. Recall Nantahala, where the Court
found that the tool of a utility-specific, cost-of-service rate approval
preempted states from “trapping” wholesale costs.313 These ratemaking tools
were largely self-implementing in individual rate cases, and to the extent that
there was a risk of under- or overcompensation, both federal and state
regulators were likely to have an opportunity to address this and apply the
applicable rules.314
Yet what may have seemed pragmatic for managing conflicts when both
federal and state regulators were focused on setting rates simply does not
serve a similar purpose in modern energy markets. Dynamic modern energy
markets challenge federal regulators to monitor and regulate transactions in
a competitive industry rather than focusing on a monopolistic energy
supplier’s costs.315 The ability of any regulator to effectively monitor and

311. Id. at 1299.
312. Although the Supreme Court in Hughes upheld the Fourth Circuit’s conclusion that
Maryland’s incentives were preempted, the Court’s analysis in reaching this conclusion does not
echo the lower court’s reasoning, which relied on a sweeping categorical application of field
preemption. Id. at 1299; PPL Energy Plus, LLC v. Nazarian, 753 F.3d 467, 474–77 (4th Cir. 2014),
aff’d sub nom. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2016). For background
discussion, see supra notes 142–76 and accompanying text.
313. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 970 (1986).
314. See id. at 966 (discussing the filed rate doctrine and the principle that once FERC sets a
rate, a state cannot interfere with FERC’s authority by declaring that rate to be unreasonable); Rossi,
supra note 6, at 1607–08 (discussing the preemption effects of the filed rate doctrine and the
imprudent exception to the doctrine).
315. See Spence, supra note 9, at 767–74 (chronicling the decline of vertically integrated energy
markets along with the traditional cost-of-service regulation model).
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enforce market rules depends not only on whether it has authority to regulate
an activity but also on the agency’s monitoring resources and enforcement
priorities. It seems particularly misguided to assume that federal agency
regulators will be positioned to regulate every market transaction.316 Courts
should be especially wary of extending field preemption principles to pro
forma or industry-wide tariffs or rules. New York v. FERC recognizes these
kinds of general restructuring rules and tariffs as foundational to the
operation of both electricity and natural-gas markets.317 But unless FERC
were to actually monitor and enforce these marketwide rules, extending a
preemptive effect would leave large categories of market behavior
unregulated.318
To the extent that such broad federal preemption continues to apply at
all, its application should be limited to those situations where FERC clearly
exercises regulatory authority over substantive aspects of wholesale
transactions, like setting wholesale energy rates. In this kind of context,
federal regulators have established clear market rules and effective ways to
monitor market conduct, providing the most compelling case for federal
preemption. Still too, such a preemption analysis is not automatic but
requires a careful assessment of foundational facts related to federal
jurisdiction. For example, it was an essential predicate to the Court’s
preemption analysis in Hughes that “FERC extensively regulates the
structure of the PJM capacity auction to ensure that it efficiently balances
supply and demand, producing a just and reasonable clearing price.”319 As
the Court also acknowledged, “FERC has approved the PJM capacity auction
as the sole ratesetting mechanism for sales of capacity to PJM, and has
deemed the clearing price per se just and reasonable.”320 The Court
concluded that FERC’s regulation of PJM’s wholesale-capacity-market
pricing mechanism preempted Maryland’s incentives,321 but it would be a
stretch to extend similar preemptive effect to FERC’s mere jurisdiction over
any practice that looks like a wholesale sale (such as net metering) or affects
a wholesale transaction, regardless of how FERC has regulated it. Hughes
simply does not speak to how wholesale markets fail to price important

316. See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 6, at 1626 (arguing that FERC does not have the opportunity
to assess “every potential violation of the public interest” and that FERC and other agencies
“frequently lack the authority to pursue or impose” remedies for misconduct).
317. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 14 (2002) (noting that FERC’s open-access regime
was not targeted at individual behaviors, but was aimed at addressing a systemic, marketwide
problem).
318. See Rossi, supra note 6, at 1645–46 (discussing how blind adherence to the filed rate
doctrine produces sweeping preemption and a similar type of regulatory gap).
319. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294 (2016).
320. Id. at 1297.
321. Id.
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values, such as environmental concerns and reliability.322 If FERC has not
adopted a regime that provides the exclusive pricing of these values in the
wholesale market, states still have plenty of space to adopt their own
initiatives to promote them with incentives and subsidies that are not directed
at wholesale rates. For example, New York has recently adopted an
ambitious clean-energy standard that includes zero-emission credits for
nuclear plants,323 a plan that is already facing a legal challenge on federalpreemption grounds.324 If these credits are calculated based on carbon
attributes of the energy produced, which is not priced in the interstate market,
they do not contradict Hughes. But, if the credits are directly tagged to
wholesale-market prices of energy, they could be preempted like the
Maryland scheme.325 This kind of analysis would require a case-specific
assessment of whether the state incentives contravene federally approved
market prices.
At its extreme, extending exclusive preemptive authority to FERC in
areas where states are providing complementary regulation risks the creation
of a new form of regulatory gap, where neither state nor federal regulators
can address the pricing of certain attributes of power supply. In adopting
New Deal-era energy statutes, Congress was likely unaware of the full range
of challenges that would be presented to modern energy markets, but
avoiding a regulatory “no man’s land” is just as fundamental and important
to the efficient operation of energy markets today as closing the Attleboro
gap was to Congress in 1935. New York v. FERC reasons that the types of
regulatory gaps the FPA was designed to address are not fixed in time based
on constitutional limits on state-regulatory authority circa 1935 but include
practical challenges for interstate energy markets.326 ONEOK echoes this

322. While Hughes does not directly speak to these values, it does recognize that PJM’s
capacity markets were focused on reliability; however, many other wholesale markets regulated by
FERC do not make an effort to price capacity, leaving this reliability function to state regulators.
Id. at 1298. Also, Hughes envisions states continuing to play some role in promoting clean-energy
resources. See id. at 1299 (naming clean-energy generation as a priority states might seek to
encourage through various incentives or state regulation policies).
323. Steven Mufson, New York State Just Rescued a Nuclear Plant from Oblivion. Why That’s
a Very Big Deal, WASH. POST (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2016/08/09/new-york-state-just-rescued-a-nuclear-plant-fromoblivion/?utm_term=.a1255c9b372c [https://perma.cc/DKT4-DVQT].
324. Saqib Rahim, Challenge Looms for N.Y.’s Clean Energy Standard, E&E PUB. (Aug. 24,
2016), http://www.eenews.net/stories/1060041976 [https://perma.cc/4WUX-CWGQ].
325. Emily Hammond & Jim Rossi, Stranded Cost and Decarbonization, 82 BROOK. L. REV.
(forthcoming
2017)
(manuscript
at
34–36),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2833870 [https://perma.cc/9EP6-CRFH]. See generally Joel B. Eisen, Dual
Electricity Federalism Is Dead, But How Dead and What Replaces It?, 8 GEO. WASH. J. ENERGY
& ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2016) (on file with author).
326. See New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 21 (2002) (reasoning that, while the FPA may have
addressed the gap identified in Attleboro, the regulatory power the FPA grants is not limited by
Attleboro but is more expansive).
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principle in recognizing concurrent state jurisdiction to complement federal
antitrust enforcement in modern natural-gas markets.327
Recognizing the statutory purpose of avoiding regulatory gaps calls for
a more dynamic assessment of jurisdiction, but this does not put everything
up for grabs anew each time there is a federalism dispute involving energy
markets. Rather, in assessing preemption the Court’s decisions in ONEOK
and Hughes show that the key inquiry is whether a state law targets a federal
regulation.328 In ONEOK, the Court emphasized that, as a general matter,
state antitrust law can complement federal antitrust regulation.329 Hughes
emphasized how the capacity market (as approved by FERC) was intended
to serve as the sole way of pricing power-supply capacity for wholesale sales
in PJM,330 but other regional pricing approaches in the wholesale market will
require a different assessment of the interaction of federal and state law. For
example, in regions of the United States where there is no wholesaleinterstate-capacity market (such as most of the Southeast),331 a state
presumably would retain its jurisdiction to address retail reliability by
adopting incentives to expand generation. Even outside of these areas, states
may adopt incentives and subsidies to address energy attributes, such as
carbon emissions, that FERC-regulated wholesale energy markets fail to
price.332 The preemption analysis ultimately depends on the reviewing
court’s foundational factual findings regarding federal regulation of a market
activity and its interaction with state regulation of the same market activity,

327. See ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 (2015) (holding that the NGA,
drafted to preserve continued exercise of state power, does not preempt state-law antitrust actions).
328. Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1298 (2016) (“States, of course,
may regulate within the domain Congress assigned to them even when their laws incidentally affect
areas within FERC’s domain. But States may not seek to achieve ends, however legitimate, through
regulatory means that intrude on FERC’s authority over interstate wholesale rates, as Maryland has
done here.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); see ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599 (2015) (indicating
that whether the NGA preempts a particular state law turns on “the target at which the state law
aims”).
329. ONEOK, 135 S. Ct. at 1599.
330. Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1297 (“FERC has approved the PJM capacity auction as the sole
ratesetting mechanism for sales of capacity to PJM, and has deemed the clearing price per se just
and reasonable.”).
331. FERC, ENERGY PRIMER: A HANDBOOK OF ENERGY MARKET BASICS 40 (2015),
https://www.ferc.gov/market-oversight/guide/energy-primer.pdf [https://perma.cc/4DBR-4E4Z]
(noting that the Southeast operates “under [a] more traditional market structure[]” and that the
Southeastern states do not participate in RTOs or independent system operators (ISOs), both of
which “operate the transmission system independently of, and foster competition for electricity
generation among, wholesale-market participants”).
332. See supra notes 323–25 and accompanying text (addressing New York’s recently adopted
Zero Emission Credits).
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focusing on whether the target at which the state law is aimed presents an
unacceptable conflict with a federal regulatory initiative.333
Regulatory gaps can be symmetrical—they can apply to both federal
and state regulation. Recognizing this provides a principled basis for
acknowledging the importance of expansive federal authority in some
contexts,334 and broad state authority in others.335 There thus is nothing
inconsistent with EPSA’s endorsement of expansive FERC jurisdiction to
address demand response in wholesale markets and continued state
regulation of many of the same market activities—even if these might
directly touch upon wholesale energy sales. Rather, the key inquiry needs to
focus on whether a preemption determination advances or hinders the
statutory purpose of avoiding a regulatory no man’s land in energy markets—
a question entirely ignored by previous precedents that embrace dual
sovereignty.
B.

Federal Regulatory Floors for Energy Markets

Recognition of statutory authorization for concurrent jurisdiction in the
regulation of modern energy markets holds promise for energy law to move
in bold new directions because it enables innovative approaches to
collaboration between federal and state regulators. Statutes such as the FPA
already explicitly allow for some collaboration between federal and state
regulators. Robert Nordhaus has recently reminded us of one example
explicitly mentioned in the statute.336 Section 209 authorizes FERC to hold
joint hearings with state regulators and to set up joint boards to address
matters otherwise within FERC’s jurisdiction.337 Elsewhere, the FPA
provides for interstate compacts to address transmission approval.338 To date,
however, these formalized, collaborative approaches have not been used
successfully.339
333. As the Court concludes in Hughes, “So long as a State does not condition payment of funds
on capacity clearing the auction, the State’s program would not suffer from the same fatal defect
that renders Maryland’s program unacceptable.” Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299.
334. See FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 780–81 (2016)
(recognizing FERC’s authority to regulate wholesale demand response markets).
335. See Hughes, 136 S. Ct. at 1299 (leaving avenues open for states to promote clean energy);
ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599–1601 (2015) (recognizing that state antitrust
law can complement federal regulation).
336. See Nordhaus, supra note 3, at 214–15 (describing FPA’s authorization of joint federal–
state hearings and boards composed of state officials but recognizing that the “mechanism” is rarely
used).
337. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 209, 49 Stat. 838, 853 (1935) (codified as amended
at 16 U.S.C. § 824h (2012)).
338. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, sec. 1221, § 216(i), 119 Stat. 946, 950–
51 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2012)).
339. See Klass & Rossi, supra note 50, at 135 (observing that no interstate transmission-siting
compact has been adopted); Nordhaus, supra note 3, at 214–15 (observing that the FPA’s jointboard mechanism “is rarely used”).
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Beyond the explicit statutory authorization to create new collaborative
institutions, federal and state regulators have taken their own initiative to
pursue many new avenues for regulatory coordination. One such approach
is what Hari Osofsky and Hannah Wiseman call “dynamic federalism,”340
exemplified most clearly by FERC’s initiative to encourage voluntary RTOs
as private institutions to help manage and coordinate interstate energy
markets.341 Such multistate-institutional arrangements have played an
undeniable role in forging dynamic new types of energy markets, though they
have required state regulators to acquiesce by approving new transmission
and generation investments by regulated utilities that participate in RTOs.342
Similarly, FERC’s regulation of regional-grid planning and cost
allocation has encouraged state experimentation in clean-energy policies to
reinforce federal goals related to the operation of regional markets.343
Increasingly, as new renewable-energy supply comes online, FERC is being
asked to work with states in integrating these resources into interstate energy
markets.344 As Emily Hammond and David Spence observe, however, overly
broad federal preemption of state incentives for new electric-power capacity
makes consistent integration of renewable-resource capacity into energy
markets nearly impossible, since many renewable resources are dependent on
state incentives.345
By contrast, recognition of concurrent jurisdiction opens up new
institutional arrangements where state and federal regulators can coordinate
regulatory approaches or operate adjacent programs that touch on the same
regulatory topics, such as solar net metering programs. Just like demand
response, authorization of customer energy resource participation in
wholesale markets presently requires states to opt in.346 Elsewhere, Thomas
Hutton and I have argued that these kinds of arrangements point to the
possibility of cooperative federalism under energy statutes, allowing FERC
to establish federal objectives, such as the promotion of clean energy, and

340. Osofsky & Wiseman, supra note 21, at 814–24.
341. Regional Transmission Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 809, 811, 831 (Jan. 6, 2000) (codified
at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
342. Id. at 811.
343. Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49842, 49848–51 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35).
344. Id. at 49848.
345. See Hammond & Spence, supra note 10, at 199–201 (noting FERC’s recent efforts to
“incentivize a greener grid” and that “some of [these] efforts have also bumped up against the
potential limits of its jurisdiction”).
346. See Jim Rossi, Federalism and the Net Metering Alternative, ELECTRICITY J., Jan.–Feb.
2016, at 13, 13 (observing that over forty states have authorized net metering programs); Jim Rossi
& Jon Wellinghoff, FERC v. EPSA and Adjacent State Regulation of Customer Energy Resources,
40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 23, 28–29 (2016) (observing that states generally have flexibility in
crafting their net metering policies).
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enlist state cooperation in their implementation.347 To take one example,
while Congress has specifically authorized a federal floor when it comes to
power-grid reliability, the FPA also recognizes that states can go further in
enacting more rigorous reliability standards.348 Recognition of concurrent
jurisdiction would allow for federal regulation of energy markets without
automatically preempting state experimentation and, especially, state
approaches that advance the same goals federal regulators have endorsed.349
In a bold recognition of this possibility, the Supreme Court’s 2016 EPSA
opinion observes, “[w]holesale demand response as implemented in the Rule
is a program of cooperative federalism, in which the States retain the last
word.”350 Other energy statutes have been recognized as endorsing
cooperative federalism,351 and scholars have advanced the argument that the
FPA and NGA are compatible with this approach.352 EPSA’s novelty is that
it is the first Supreme Court decision to explicitly recognize cooperative
federalism as compatible with the allocation of federal–state power under a
New Deal-era energy statute.
The Court’s decision also sheds light on the significance of FERC’s role
in establishing these kinds of arrangements. The Court reasoned that FERC’s
demand response rule’s “opt-out” opportunity for states (who may choose to
eliminate customer bidding into wholesale demand response markets)
“removes any conceivable doubt” as to its compliance with the allocation of
federal–state authority under the FPA.353 While the opt-out feature of Order
745 may have deflated any claim by the challengers that FERC’s rule was
coercive, nothing in EPSA concluded that allowing states the opportunity to
veto customer participation in FERC’s wholesale-market programs is always
necessary to sustain a cooperative federalism program under the FPA.354 A

347. See Rossi & Hutton, supra note 21, at 1288–89 (arguing that federal energy statutes are
consistent with floor preemption, which allows subnational energy-regulation innovations).
348. The Electricity Modernization Act of 2005 expands federal regulation over reliability but
also specifically states that this is not intended “to preempt any authority of any State to take action
to ensure the safety, adequacy, and reliability of electric service within that State, . . . as long as
such action does not result in lesser reliability outside the State . . . .” Energy Policy Act of 2005,
Pub. L. 109-58, sec. 1211, § 215(h)(3), 119 Stat. 941, 945 (2005) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C.
§ 824o(i)(3) (2012)).
349. See Rossi & Hutton, supra note 21, at 1288 (describing the concept of floor preemption,
in which federal law provides “only a minimum that precludes more lax state standards” and leaves
“states the authority to adopt more restrictive requirements”).
350. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 780 (2016).
351. See, e.g., FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 767 (1982) (noting that the Public Utility
Regulatory Policies Act establishes a program of cooperative federalism).
352. See, e.g., Rossi & Hutton, supra note 21, at 1316 (arguing that “the history and structure
of the FPA favor an alternative approach—energy federalism—that allows the use of floor
preemption tools”).
353. EPSA, 136 S. Ct. at 779–80.
354. To the extent this is an open question, it will likely be resolved under constitutional (rather
than statutory) federalism doctrines. Cf. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167–68 (1992)
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state opt out does not appear necessary under EPSA to support FERC’s
jurisdiction to address demand response insofar as FERC’s regulation
ultimately hinges on the participation of demand response providers in
wholesale markets, not on any sort of claim that FERC lacks the power to
preempt states.
EPSA thus appears to leave FERC a considerable range of options in
addressing state regulations that impede the effective operation of interstateenergy markets that FERC regulates. For example, if FERC were to make a
finding that state prohibitions on customer participation in wholesale demand
response markets impairs competition in wholesale power markets, FERC
presumably could make a discrimination finding and preempt these
prohibitions. In FERC’s rules regarding transmission planning, for example,
the agency decided to preempt many state rights of first refusal that favor
incumbent utilities, though the agency limited its preemption to wholesale
transmission.355 As it has with demand response, FERC could have chosen
to allow states an opt-out process for rights of first refusal. But in recognizing
how this is harmful to interstate competition and discriminates against
merchant transmission providers, FERC instead chose to preempt states,
setting a floor in the basic ground rules surrounding transmission planning.356
Ultimately, EPSA recognizes that these are not decisions that are dictated by
an abstract principle of federalism or state sovereignty under the FPA.
Rather, at the core these are pragmatic choices about the best institutional
balance for regulating modern energy markets—decisions that Congress has
delegated to FERC in recognition of its expertise.
C.

Clearing the Jurisprudential Thicket

In order for these kinds of institutional federalism arrangements to
succeed, however, courts must eliminate once and for all the doctrinal relics
of dual sovereignty.357 It is time for the Court to recognize that field
preemption, long celebrated in energy regulation, is an anachronism that
should no longer have a role in modern preemption analysis under these
statutes. At the very least, field preemption needs to be limited to its
supporting precedents involving cost-of-service regulation, where state and
federal regulators were applying the same basic regulatory model and
objectives. In areas where concurrent jurisdiction is authorized, it remains

(discussing how programs of cooperative federalism have been replicated in a number of federal
statutes).
355. For discussion of this issue, see Klass & Rossi, supra note 50, at 193.
356. See Transmission Planning and Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning and Operating
Public Utilities, 76 Fed. Reg. 49842, 49846 (Aug. 11, 2011) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 35) (outlining
minimum requirements for state public utility transmission providers).
357. In raising concerns with the rise of “national federalism without doctrine,” Abbe Gluck
also recognizes fifteen doctrinal questions presented by forms of statutory federalism more
generally. Gluck, supra note 20, at 2022–42.
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important for courts and federal regulators to be attentive to the factual and
policy rationales that support jurisdiction, approaching these questions
prospectively rather than in reaction to dual sovereignty arguments advanced
by litigants. Finally, courts must recognize their own limits in resolving
energy-federalism disputes and better clarify the significance of democratic
agency procedures and expertise in advancing federalism.
1. Ending Wholesale-Market Field Preemption.—The rise of concurrent
jurisdiction calls into question whether the traditional field preemption
doctrine should continue to play any role under energy statutes. Precedents
such as Nantahala and Schneidewind remain good law. However, at the very
minimum they need to be limited in their application to scenarios involving
similar cost-of-service regulatory tools, if not recast as applications of
conflict rather than field preemption.
Field preemption is simply
incompatible with the recognition of concurrent jurisdiction over aspects of
wholesale energy markets under these statutes. It leads to overly broad
federal preemption decisions, routinely confuses courts, and thwarts the
primary purposes of these energy statutes by creating the potential for new
regulatory gaps.358
Even the core energy precedents decided by the Court using fieldpreemption language acknowledge that field-preemption analysis cannot, on
its own terms, answer the core federalism questions that need to be addressed.
Consider again Nantahala, one of the leading modern field-preemption cases
under the FPA. The Court held that since “FERC clearly has exclusive
jurisdiction over the rates to be charged . . . interstate wholesale customers,”
a state “may not conclude in setting retail rates that the FERC-approved
wholesale rates are unreasonable.”359 A state is prohibited, for example, from
“trapping” costs by exercising its “undoubted jurisdiction over retail sales to
prevent the wholesaler-as-seller from recovering the costs of paying the
FERC-approved rate.”360 While the Court spoke here in terms of exclusive
jurisdiction, it is a mistake to conclude that, as a categorical matter, the setting
of wholesale rates “field preempts” states. The Court did not reason that the
statute itself occupied the field, but instead spoke in terms of the potential
“interference” that states could present to FERC-approved rates without a
finding of federal preemption.361 Courts have recognized that this is not a

358. As Justice Kagan astutely observed in her concurrence in Kurns v. Railroad Friction
Products Corp., 132 S. Ct. 1261 (2012), “[v]iewed through the lens of modern preemption law,
[Justice Brandeis’s field-preemption decision in] Napier is an anachronism.” Id. at 1270 (Kagan, J.,
concurring).
359. Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476 U.S. 953, 966 (1986).
360. Id. at 970.
361. See id. at 966 (rejecting the argument that the scope of FPC jurisdiction over wholesale
gas and electricity should be determined on a case-by-case basis and instead determining that
deference should be given to Congress’s intent to ensure states do not interfere with FERC’s
authority to set wholesale rates).
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bright-line or categorical approach to preemption. Some have devised an
exception to the filed-rate-preemption approach of Nantahala, recognizing
that states may deny a utility the opportunity to recover costs incurred as a
result of buying power at FERC-approved rates if the specific purchase (apart
from the actual rate that was paid) is deemed imprudent.362
To the extent that Nantahala’s reasoning relies on an assessment of
whether a specific state-regulatory action interferes with a particular federal
rate, however, it is not an application of field preemption at all. Instead, in
placing its primary attention on tensions between a federal and state
approach, the key inquiry becomes whether the state-regulatory action
presents an obstacle to the implementation of a federal-approved wholesale
rate. Using field preemption to reach this conclusion would eliminate a broad
range of state-regulatory decisions assessing prudence, which the Court in
Nantahala explicitly preserved for state regulators.363 Field preemption
simply does none of a court’s primary analytical work in reaching a
preemption conclusion. Instead, at the very minimum, a court reaching a
conclusion of federal preemption always implicitly depends on its assessment
of whether a state-regulatory decision presents an obstacle. Moreover,
resorting to field preemption can lead to overbroad preemption decisions, in
effect foreclosing a broad range of otherwise permissible state regulatory
actions.364
The recent rise of concurrent jurisdiction also throws into question
whether Schneidewind, another darling of the dual sovereignty approach,
should continue to be understood as a field preemption case. Field
preemption would foreclose any state regulation in the relevant field as a
matter of implied preemption. However, despite its strong field preemption
rhetoric, Schneidewind itself suggests that the scope of the field can only be
determined upon an examination of the objective of the particular state
regulation at issue.365 Drawing on a similar approach, ONEOK elaborates
that this requires an inquiry into “the target at which the state law aims.”366
In other words, this is more of a conflict or obstacle than a field preemption
test. A broad interpretation of Schneidewind is even more problematic in that
it would authorize FERC to make broad regulatory decisions that undermine
362. See, e.g., Pub. Serv. Co. v. Patch, 167 F.3d 29, 35 (1st Cir. 1998) (adopting the imprudent
exception in the First Circuit); Pike Cty. Light & Power Co.–Elec. Div. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n,
465 A.2d 735, 737–38 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1983) (holding that a state may deny a utility company
from recovering costs for purchasing power at a FERC-approved rate when cheaper alternatives are
available).
363. See Nantahala, 476 U.S. at 972 (assuming without deciding that states retain authority to
address the prudency of purchased-power decisions).
364. For a discussion of the necessity of careful assessment of preemption in the context of
particular federal approval of a monitoring action regarding wholesale rates, see Rossi, supra note
6, at 1642–44.
365. See supra notes 293–95 and accompanying text.
366. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1599 (2015).
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state environmental-protection goals under the Clean Water Act or other
environmental statutes that delegate a role to state regulators.367
If the form of field preemption Justice Brandeis had in mind in Napier
was ever appropriate for energy statutes, these cases illustrate that it no longer
has a place in federalism disputes in modern energy markets. At the very
minimum, if these decisions continue to be construed as field preemption
cases, their scope should be limited to wholesale rates actually set or
approved by FERC and should not include federal regulation of practices
affecting rates. Instead of relying on the fiction of field preemption, courts
need to focus on whether federal and state regulations of energy markets are
compatible. For example, in finding federal preemption of the Maryland
generation incentives, Hughes relies on foundational facts regarding FERC’s
approach to regulating PJM’s capacity market368 and the regulatory target at
which the Maryland program aims (namely, the FERC-approved wholesale
capacity market).369 It did not frame the preemption analysis in terms of some
abstract, fixed field defined by statute, but carefully assessed facts regarding
the nature of FERC’s regulation of the PJM capacity market and applied the
aims test from ONEOK.370 For all practical purposes, it thus appears that the
Supreme Court has replaced energy field preemption with an assessment of
obstacle preemption (in the setting of wholesale rates, under FERC’s
substantive jurisdiction) or conflict preemption (in assessing FERC’s
exercise of remedial jurisdiction over practices affecting rates).371
At bottom, in the regulation of modern energy markets, field preemption
is little more than a fiction. It ultimately does none of the analytical work in
assessing whether federal energy statutes preempt state regulations since a
preemption finding under these statutes ultimately depends on first assessing
the issue as an obstacle or conflict preemption case. Absent clear language
to the contrary in a statute or in an agency’s explicit decision to exercise
broad preemption over a specific activity, preemption analysis in modern
367. For a discussion of this issue, see generally Alexandra B. Klass & Jim Rossi,
Reconstituting the Federalism Battle in Energy Transportation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2017).
368. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1294 (2016) (discussing the policy
and factual concerns that influenced Maryland’s regulators to develop the program at issue).
369. Id. at 1298–99.
370. This observation is made clear by Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence in Hughes. See id. at
1300 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“Using the purpose of the Federal Power Act as the ‘ultimate
touchstone’ of its pre-emption inquiry rather than resting on generic pre-emption frameworks
unrelated to the Federal Power Act, the Court holds that Maryland has impermissibly impeded the
performance of one of FERC’s core regulatory duties.” (citation omitted)); id. (“The Court,
however, also rightly recognizes the importance of protecting the States’ ability to contribute, within
their regulatory domain, to the Federal Power Act’s goal of ensuring a sustainable supply of efficient
and price effective energy.”).
371. The sole remaining exception may be Justice Thomas, whose concurrence in Hughes
purports to support preemption based entirely on the FPA’s delegation of authority to FERC to
regulate wholesale energy sales. Id. at 1301 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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energy markets should attempt a case-by-case analysis of foundational facts
and of regulatory conflict, and should not be decided based on field
preemption alone. Courts would be well-advised to abandon the use of field
preemption in this context entirely.
Despite the Court’s recent movement away from dual sovereignty, some
courts may not have received a clean enough message. For example, to date,
at least one Eighth Circuit Judge’s opinion takes the wrong message
altogether from Hughes, citing the case to endorse dual sovereignty and a
sweeping application of field preemption.372 This opinion is particularly
startling because, unlike the PJM market tariff that was the source of federal
preemption in Hughes, under the Midcontinent Independent Transmission
System Operator (MISO) tariff at issue no regulator or court has found FERC
has exclusive authority to regulate all aspects of energy capacity markets in
Minnesota and North Dakota.373 Fortunately, no other judge joined the
opinion,374 so it is unlikely to have a precedential impact, but it shows how
lower courts are slow to move away from dual sovereignty’s doctrinal relics
such as field preemption—even following clear, recent signals from the
Supreme Court of a more pragmatic jurisdictional approach.
2. Factual and Policy Rationales for Federal Jurisdiction.—Of course
attention to the nature of jurisdiction will often also require that courts define
its scope. Outside of narrow activities that are explicitly designated as
beyond the reach of federal regulators, EPSA emphasizes that the starting
inquiry in addressing federalism disputes in energy statutes is whether federal
regulators are authorized to address an activity.375 In deciding whether
federal regulation is authorized to regulate in the first place courts must pay
attention to the statute itself, rather than some abstract set of federalism
canons or principles that lack any foundation in statutory law.
One of the concerns raised by modern extensions of federal jurisdiction
under energy statutes—and at the core of the D.C. Circuit opinion holding
that FERC lacks jurisdiction over demand response376—is whether the statute
contains any “limiting principle” to constrain FERC’s assertion of authority
over energy markets. These limiting principles are important to recognizing
that federal regulation cannot go too far. Perhaps this concern is just as
significant today, where there are fears of federal energy regulators indirectly
imposing a carbon tax,377 as it was during the New Deal era.
372. See North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 F.3d 912, 927 (8th Cir. 2016) (Murphy, J., concurring
in part) (referring to FERC’s jurisdiction to regulate “certain parameters” of the capacity market as
exclusive).
373. Id. at 913–17.
374. Id. at 923.
375. FERC v. Elec. Power Supply Ass’n (EPSA), 136 S. Ct. 760, 767 (2016).
376. See supra notes 132–40 and accompanying text.
377. For the claim that FERC has sweeping statutory authority to address carbon emissions
through its regulation of energy markets, see generally Christopher J. Bateman & James T.B. Tripp,
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The Supreme Court’s decision in EPSA acknowledges a limiting
principle for FERC’s exercise of expansive jurisdiction over market practices
related to wholesale rates. As Joel Eisen has highlighted, courts have an
established standard to discern practices that “directly affect” rates, in
contrast to those practices that merely have an incidental effect on rates.378
Under section 205 of the FPA, which required FERC to evaluate individual
utility rates for the sale of power at wholesale, these principles are well
established as a limit on FERC’s jurisdiction in regulating the “rates or
charges” demanded or received, as well as “all rules or regulations affecting
or pertaining” to such rates or charges.379 EPSA correctly applied this test in
making a judicial finding that demand response is squarely within FERC’s
jurisdiction.380
But courts should not overread EPSA as requiring courts themselves to
always connect harms to remedies under the FPA in assessing whether FERC
is acting within its jurisdiction. This causation test, which links practices to
the rates associated with any particular utility’s sales, is best understood as a
pragmatic requirement for FERC to make factual and policy findings, not as
a fixed judicial or common law threshold a court can articulate in the abstract.
It is significant to note that, under New Deal-era energy statutes, FERC’s
remedial authority to act proactively is not automatic, but requires the agency
to make some finding of undue discrimination. Under section 206 of the
FPA, FERC is authorized to initiate proactive proceedings to address
industry-wide practices.381 But as the Court observed in New York v. FERC,
section 206 requires FERC to affirmatively make a discrimination finding
before it can exercise its remedial authority over “practices . . . affecting”
rates.382
An expansive construction of FERC’s power to address
“practices . . . affecting” rates is hardly a roving invitation for the agency to
impose any proactive policy preference it chooses on firms in energy
markets. Rather, the statute constrains the agency by requiring it show a
pragmatic linkage to interstate wholesale sales and also to make an
affirmative finding of undue discrimination.
Toward Greener FERC Regulation of the Power Industry, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 275 (2014)
(arguing that the FPA implicitly allows FERC to consider environmental effects of power
generation in setting just and reasonable rates), and STEVEN WEISSMAN & ROMANY WEBB, 2
ADDRESSING CLIMATE CHANGE WITHOUT LEGISLATION: HOW THE FEDERAL ENERGY
REGULATORY COMMISSION CAN USE ITS EXISTING LEGAL AUTHORITY TO REDUCE GREENHOUSE
GAS
EMISSIONS
AND
INCREASE
CLEAN
ENERGY
USE
3
(2014),
https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/CLEE/FERC_Report_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6U3VPH58] (outlining ways FERC could act while “relying on its current legal authority”).
378. See Eisen, supra note 60, at 1812–34 (describing the development and evolution of the
standard).
379. Federal Power Act, ch. 687, sec. 213, § 205(a), 49 Stat. 838, 851 (1935) (codified as
amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a) (2012)).
380. See supra notes 233–43 and accompanying text.
381. Federal Power Act, sec. 213, § 206(a) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824e(a)).
382. New York v. FERC, 535 U.S. 1, 27 (2002).
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This kind of discrimination finding by FERC allows federal jurisdiction
to evolve and adapt to new factual and policy circumstances. No doubt, after
EPSA, FERC has expansive potential authority over practices affecting
wholesale rates, as well as clear regulatory tools authorizing federal
regulation. However, while EPSA appears to embrace strong deference to
FERC regarding its factual findings and policy positions,383 that does not
leave the agency the ability to broaden or contract its jurisdiction over energy
markets without principle. In adopting proactive marketwide rules, it is not
enough that the tools regulators used to address discriminatory practices
relate to wholesale markets in some general sense. Rather, at the time these
rules are adopted, federal regulators are obligated to show how their rules are
directly related to wholesale rates, or are tailored to address the kind of
market discrimination that FERC has identified as a basis for exercising
jurisdiction over a practice that affects wholesale rates.
For example, FERC would be acting on questionable authority if it
simply declares illegal an industry-wide practice because the agency has
concluded that this practice disadvantages a specific energy supplier or power
generator without any additional facts or explanation. Rather, FERC must
accompany such an assertion of jurisdiction with an explanation of how this
kind of discrimination connects to the wholesale energy markets over which
it has jurisdiction. The FPA, along with the basic expectations of arbitrary
and capricious review, obligates FERC to explain how such a remedy is
connected to the goal of protecting consumers or competitive power markets,
so the agency would be obligated to provide factual findings or policy
rationales to support its assertion of jurisdiction based on the harm to a
supplier. The agency would be standing on its firmest ground in regulating
“practice . . . affecting” rates if it not only makes a finding or provides a
policy rationale regarding why such discrimination is harmful but also
explains how its remedy is tailored to address that form of harm.384
After EPSA, regulators ignore these factual and policy rationales at their
peril, as they derive from the clear language of the statute and also are an
expectation of arbitrary and capricious review. There is a danger if courts
make these findings themselves, rather than review the agency’s findings
with deference where appropriate. But it also would be harmful for courts to
383. See Sharon B. Jacobs, Energy Deference, 40 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. F. 49, 51–54 (2016)
(discussing how the Court’s analysis in EPSA represents a variation of “thin rationality” review or
“super deference”).
384. See Matthew R. McGuire, Comment, (Mis)Understanding “Undue Discrimination”:
FERC’s Misguided Effort to Extend the Boundaries of the Federal Power Act, 19 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 549, 576–77 (2012), for an argument to similar effect. Although McGuire uses a similar
argument to critique FERC’s regulations that favor independent transmission lines, id. at 550–52, I
am not convinced that this is outside of FERC’s jurisdiction. FERC made multiple findings that
support a need for new transmission investment and that utility-based financing has systematically
led to underinvestment and reduced competition in the industry. I am thus much more sympathetic
to FERC’s effort to regulate transmission planning than McGuire.
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ignore the need for some agency findings to support expansive jurisdiction
into practices related to wholesale energy markets. While EPSA undeniably
embraces deference to FERC, it does not eviscerate the FPA’s core
requirements. The agency must explain how a practice is connected to
wholesale rates, why this produces discrimination that is harmful, and how
the agency’s remedies are connected (or directly related) to these harms.
3. Encouraging Agency (Rather Than Judicial) Preemption.—
Ultimately, the Supreme Court’s recent decisions regarding energy statutes
open the possibility that energy federalism will finally follow the path of
many other statutory-federalism programs. Jessica Bulman-Polzen has
recently offered a qualified defense of executive-branch-led federalism as a
way of improving the democratic political process.385 A number of other
scholars have also advanced an argument that agency preemption can be as
transparent and democratic as relying on Congress to make preemption
decisions.386 In areas such as health care, environmental law, and marijuana
prohibition enforcement, the preferred approach to federalism is primarily an
executive-branch prerogative, rather than an invitation for the judiciary to
impose its own federalism.387
Especially in contexts where Congress has delegated broad authority to
a federal agency to regulate market structure and activities, such as under
energy statutes, an executive-led approach to preemption analysis can help to
ensure that regulation does not leave market activities unchecked. Even if
dual sovereignty is no longer required by statute, federal-energy regulators
possess the power to affirmatively preempt state regulation, in instances
where they believe that this promotes regulatory goals. For example, as I
have highlighted, in instances where FERC presents a factual and policy
rationale that state regulation promotes discrimination against nonincumbent
energy suppliers or hinders interstate energy markets, it may be appropriate
for federal regulators to address the activity.388
Recognizing agency authority to preempt is necessary, but it is not
sufficient to promote accountability and expertise in the regulation of energy
markets. To ensure democratic accountability for preemption decisions, it is
important to ensure that the agency, not courts, make the ultimate decision
regarding the preemptive effect (if any) of federal regulation. As Galle and
385. Jessica Bulman-Pozen, Executive Federalism Comes to America, 102 VA. L. REV. 953,
954–55 (2016).
386. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee, Preemption Hard Look Review, Regulatory Interaction, and
the Quest for Stewardship and Intergenerational Equity, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1521, 1525 (2009)
(advocating “hard look” review of agency preemption decisions as a mechanism to retain agency
accountability); Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1936–39 (2008)
(defending agency preemption based on institutional competence and transparency arguments).
387. See Bulman-Pozen, supra note 385, at 976 (discussing these examples as emblematic of
executive federalism).
388. See supra note 241–52 and accompanying text.
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Seidenfeld highlight, the “process behind the federal decision [to preempt
state law] is nearly as important as its substance.”389 Given the impacts such
a decision can have on state experimentation and on the underlying premise
of state law as complementing federal regulation, such a decision is best made
through an open and transparent agency decision-making process, such as
notice-and-comment rulemaking, rather than as implicit regulatory choice or
as a mere afterthought, as articulated in a brief.390
An agency-preemption approach to energy federalism underscores the
significance to the democratic process of an agency such as FERC making
an open and transparent decision regarding what kind of institutional
federalism arrangement is desirable for activities in energy markets. Where
FERC has failed to make such a preemption decision itself, it smacks of
judicial imperialism for a court to impose its own view of preemption onto
the agency for several reasons.
First, notwithstanding Hughes, it is not at all clear that the FPA or (any
other statute) creates an implied cause of action for a private party to ask a
federal court to make a preemption determination that enjoins state regulation
where the challenger is not seeking review of a FERC decision regarding
preemption.391 As a general matter, FERC, not federal courts, should have
the first bite at the apple in defining agency jurisdiction, especially where
jurisdiction over new kinds of transactions or practices in energy markets are
at issue.

389. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 386, at 1997.
390. Courts reviewing agency action have long disfavored post hoc agency articulation of
rationales. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87 (1943) (“The grounds upon which an
administrative order must be judged are those upon which the record discloses that its action was
based.”); Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 965
(2007) (explaining that under the Chenery principle, an agency must articulate supporting facts and
the underlying rationale for a decision at the time the agency acts, not after).
391. The FPA, along with the Administrative Procedures Act, provides for judicial review of
FERC decisions. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 378, 392 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 702 (2012)) (creating Title V of the United States Code, which includes the original
Administrative Procedures Act, Pub. L. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946)); Federal Power Act, ch. 687,
sec. 213, § 313, 49 Stat. 838, 860 (1935) (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 824l (2012)).
Importantly, however, these statutes do not expressly create an avenue for private challengers to
raise federal preemption claims, requiring private challengers to ground their legal challenges in the
Supremacy Clause. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012), federal district courts are prohibited from
enjoining, suspending, or restraining operation or compliance with any order affecting rates
chargeable by a public utility that is made by a state administrative agency or ratemaking body
where jurisdiction is based solely on repugnance of the order to the federal Constitution and the
order does not interfere with interstate commerce. 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2012). In 2015, the Supreme
Court held that the Constitution does not create a private cause of action to enjoin a state under the
Supremacy Clause. Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Center, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1378, 1383 (2015). It
further held that equitable Ex parte Young-type preemption challenges to enjoin unlawful state
action were foreclosed by a federal statute’s provision of other remedies and judicial
administrability concerns. Id. at 1385. For development of the argument that implied private
preemption claims can be problematic under the FPA, see Matthew R. Christiansen, The FPA and
the Private Right to Preempt, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 129, 138–48 (2016).
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Second, allowing judicial resolution of jurisdictional disputes prior to
an agency’s decision about them is not desirable from the perspective of
democratic accountability. An agency is required to explain its preemption
choices in an open and participatory administrative process and is also
subject to congressional oversight, whereas a court lacks this kind of political
accountability for its decisions regarding preemption under energy
statutes.392
Third, since any judicial preemption decisions binds an agency,
premature judicial resolution of preemption disputes makes energy statutes
less flexible and adaptive to new technological developments and market
decisions. By contrast, an agency preemption decision can be changed
through the administrative decision-making process. This sweeping
precedential impact makes dual sovereignty a poor fit for the modern
administrative process surrounding federal regulation.
Where there is no transparent process or decision before an agency
leading to a preemption finding, this should weigh against a court reaching a
preemption decision on its own. Such an approach has considerable support
in the accepted administrative law principle that courts should not afford
deference to post hoc agency rationales.393 For example, in upholding state
antitrust remedies in ONEOK and refusing to extend Chevron394 deference to
FERC, the Supreme Court considered it significant that FERC itself failed to
take any position in its regulatory proceedings on whether it intended its
regulatory approach to have a preemptive effect on states.395
However, in upholding the Fourth Circuit’s rejection of Maryland’s
incentives in Hughes, the Court was not sensitive to this concern. Since the
Supreme Court was reviewing a private challenge to the state program that
was brought in federal court, it ultimately relied on judicial, rather than
agency, factual determinations regarding the nature of federal regulation of
capacity markets.396 However, FERC had failed to make any affirmative
finding on its own that Maryland’s power-generation incentives presented a
conflict with “just and reasonable” rates under PJM’s capacity-pricing plan,
the matter pending on review in Hughes.397 Indeed, when asked to address
these matters in its regulatory process, the agency even went so far as to claim

392. See supra Part II (describing the sweeping preemption approach of dual sovereignty).
393. See supra note 381–82 and accompanying text.
394. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
395. ONEOK, Inc. v. Learjet, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1591, 1602–03 (2015).
396. See Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288, 1297 (2016) (“We agree with
the Fourth Circuit’s judgment that Maryland’s program sets an interstate wholesale rate,
contravening the FPA’s division of authority between state and federal regulators.” (emphasis
added)).
397. Id. at 1297–98 (discussing FERC’s reasons for rejecting Maryland’s plan but failing to
acknowledge any affirmative findings made by FERC to prove a conflict with “just and reasonable”
rates under PJM’s capacity-pricing plan).
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that it was bound to the preemption approach of courts.398 FERC’s position
that Maryland’s incentives are preempted was not the product of a transparent
decision-making process and was only articulated post hoc, in reaction to
judicial decisions and in its appellate briefs on review before the Supreme
Court. If FERC truly had wished to reject Maryland’s incentives, it could
have made a transparent regulatory decision of its own to do so, rather than
waiting for a court to make this decision in reviewing the agency.399
To the extent that FERC chose not to make its own preemption decision
regarding Maryland’s power-supply incentives in PJM, or refused to use its
own regulatory processes to develop an agency position on preemption in
modern-energy-capacity markets, this created the opportunity for a federal
court hearing a private-federal-preemption challenge to the state program to
step in and make its own foundational factual findings regarding state powersupply incentives. Perhaps lower courts and the Supreme Court got these
foundational facts and the ultimate conclusion right, and PJM’s tariff (as
initially approved by FERC) is, in fact, the sole way of pricing capacity in
this particular regional organized market. Importantly, however, FERC took
no position itself on the issue and courts brought no particular expertise to
adjudicating these factual findings.400
More significantly still, such judicial findings could leave federal
regulators little flexibility to work with states, exasperating the type of
“reverse” Attleboro gap hypothesized above401—judicially assigning FERC
de jure authority even where the agency has shown no interest at all in
exercising it. It thus seems inconsistent with energy statutes such as the FPA
for courts to make a preemption finding where FERC has not previously done
so itself, especially when the effect of preemption is to preclude any
complementary state regulation. This kind of judicially imposed preemption

398. See supra notes 215–16 and accompanying text.
399. Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Hughes v. Talen Energy Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288
(2016) (No. 14-614) (“We don’t have FERC’s opinion. We only have it through the SG. I thought
there was a doctrine called primary jurisdiction . . . .”). The Supreme Court’s opinion in Hughes
did not address this.
400. Even where, as in PJM, capacity markets provide some reliability pricing in the wholesale
market, it is not clear that they provide a perfect market valuation of reliability values associated
with different energy resources. The American Public Power Association, for example, has
highlighted how long-term contracts provide a superior way of promoting reliability in comparison
to capacity markets and that capacity markets can result in different reliability pricing based on how
a state chooses to address its retail market. Randy Elliot, Staying Power of a Bad Idea: Capacity
Markets’ Reliability Pricing Mechanism, AM. PUB. POWER ASS’N (Sept. 8, 2015),
http://blog.publicpower.org/sme/?p=761 [https://perma.cc/3N7B-PP9A]. For a similar argument
being made in an amicus brief filed in the Hughes case, see Brief of Amici Curiae Am. Pub. Power
Ass’n and Nat’l Rural Elec. Coop. Ass’n in Support of Petitioners at 29, Hughes v. Talen Energy
Mktg., LLC, 136 S. Ct. 1288 (2014) (No. 14-614) (arguing that “long-term contracting . . . [was] an
intended and indispensable counterpart to the attainment” of FERC’s goal of supporting investment
in new infrastructure).
401. See supra subpart IV(A).
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approach lacks any democratic process to ensure political accountability for
the statutory interpretation behind it—a flaw that echoes the ghost of dual
sovereignty to the extent that courts themselves routinely defined the
jurisdictional bright line, not FERC. By binding the agency’s ability to allow
complementary state approaches in the future, such an approach dictates the
federalism balance for the agency, regardless of how well that regulatory
approach actually works in energy markets.
By contrast, if courts were to more consistently recognize concurrent
jurisdiction as a starting premise for understanding the allocation of federal–
state authority over new market transactions under energy statutes, any
departure from this would sit squarely in the wheelhouse of FERC’s
jurisdiction and expertise, making it incumbent on the agency to only
preempt states after an open and transparent agency decision-making process.
An agency preemption approach thus promises to be more democratic and
consistent with energy statutes than courts imposing relief post hoc through
a binding judicial precedent, as typically has occurred with dual sovereignty.
V.

Conclusion

Recent Supreme Court decisions consistently reject dual sovereignty as
the organizing federalism principle under energy statutes. The Court’s recent
evaluation of jurisdictional disputes has been focused on the statutory
objective of avoiding a regulatory no man’s land, and its fixation on a
jurisdictional bright line has faded. In recognizing authorization for
concurrent jurisdiction under these statutes, the Court’s recent decisions
direct energy federalism towards a brave new path, inviting regulators to
consider new institutional arrangements as they address problems in modern
energy markets.
Yet this path is not unencumbered. Recent lower court cases show how
precedents and doctrinal relics of dual sovereignty can present new
regulatory gaps in modern energy markets. Courts and regulators should be
wary of invoking precedents that fixate on dual sovereignty, especially where
it is not required by statute. In modern energy markets, routine adherence to
a dual sovereignty approach comes at the expense of state and federal
regulators exploring more effective forms of regulation. Like other aspects
of economic and social life, the complexity of modern energy markets
requires regulators to recognize multiple energy “federalism(s)”—according
to Heather Gerken’s insightful characterization, a pluralistic rather than a
singular approach to allocating power between the federal government and
the states.402

402. Heather K. Gerken, Our Federalism(s), 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1549, 1573 (2012)
(noting that the “ends of federalism are plural” and questioning scholars who approach federalism
as if “there is only one means” to achieving these ends).
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Recent Supreme Court decisions that embrace concurrent jurisdiction
should serve as a reminder that the federalism in regulatory statutes is not an
abstract principle that is frozen in time, but instead must adapt to the factual
and policy features of modern economic life. In this sense, the Court’s recent
rejection of dual sovereignty has returned basic decisions regarding the
federalism balance in energy markets to the agency and political processes,
rather than relegating it entirely to legalistic formalisms. By acknowledging
space for regulators and stakeholders to develop more collaborative
solutions, the Court has opened up a brave new path for energy federalism—
an approach that could serve the goals of other types of regulation well too.403
Advancing this trajectory will require courts to ensure that dual sovereignty’s
doctrinal relics do not impede more democratic, and more dynamic,
approaches to federalism.

403. Cf. Gluck, supra note 20, at 2003–06 (offering Massachusetts’s health-reform experiment
as an example of the federal government working with a state to implement a federal goal or policy).

